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EBATES as to whether or not there should be a North Ameri-
can perimeter appear increasingly sterile and miss the point that
a perimeter has existed for many years in the defence field. That
perimeter is steadily being strengthened in other fields in light of the
changing nature of the security threats to North America. This paper
argues for a continued level of cooperation in many areas of the police,
intelligence and immigration sectors, which is resulting in the strengthen-
ing of the existing perimeter. How far the perimeter should go; whether
it should provide for both physical and economic security and for the full
mobility of labour; whether it could be constructed all at once as part of a
"strategic bargain," or through "aggressive incrementalism," or at an
even slower pace are also issues discussed. Whether the perimeter or as-
pects of it should also include Mexico is another fundamental issue on
which there is no clear answer except at the level of principle. The Euro-
pean model of "two-speeds" would appear to be the best one for North
America at this time.
NAFFA and the CUSFTA created a kind of low level economic perim-
eter around the three countries, providing for free trade between the
three countries with each country maintaining its own level of protection
vis-A-vis third countries. The increasing level of economic integration of
the Canadian and Mexican economies with the U.S. economy since the
entry into force of CUSFTA and NAFTA highlights the challenges faced
by those two countries vis-A-vis their major trading partner that believes
that security trumps trade. Several Canadian individuals and business or-
ganizations have proposed devising a strategy to respond to this new U.S.
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paradigm shift by offering concessions to meet U.S. concerns on physical
security and to obtain greater certainty from the United States with re-
spect to more assured access to U.S. markets. I find that there are several
disconnects to such proposals: threats to Canadian security should be
dealt with for Canadian reasons and not to placate the United States;
work on the physical security dimension is being addressed without any
linkage to greater economic security; and to the extent that the window of
opportunity ever existed for such a trade-off, it is now closed.
I also support those who believe that the level of economic integration
with the United States has reached the point where a new agreement with
the United States is required. The current uncertainties of our border are
not only creating potential havoc for cross-border trade but have had a
negative impact on investment decisions from outside North America. I
argue the need for a Royal Commission on Canada's economic prospects.
Proposals for increased labour mobility between Canada and the United
States will go nowhere unless and until there is a new agreement gov-
erning economic integration.
Proposals for various sorts of a North American security perimeter
have been around for some time, and can be traced back to 1823 and
President Monroe's unilateral declaration that "the American conti-
nents .... are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colo-
nization by any European powers."1 In 1904, President Theodore
Roosevelt stated that the United States was justified in exercising "inter-
national police power" to put an end to chronic unrest or wrongdoing in
the Western Hemisphere. This so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine contained a great irony: whereas the Monroe Doctrine
sought to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, the
Roosevelt Corollary justified American intervention throughout the
Western Hemisphere. 2 One could argue, therefore, that those aspects of
President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy of September
2002 which deal with pre-emptive action and unilateralism merely modify
the Roosevelt Corollary by expanding it from the Western Hemisphere to
the entire world, i.e., the new Bush Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. 3
While the main thrust of the Monroe Doctrine had been towards the
territories south of the United States, it also covered what was then Brit-
ish North America. Many years later, another form of perimeter was
contained in President Franklin Roosevelt's assurance to Prime Minister
Mackenzie King at Queen's University in August 1938 that an attack
1. The Monroe Doctrine, Address to Congress, Dec. 2, 1823, available at http://
usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/50.htm:
2. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, available at http://www.uiowa.
edu/-c030162/Common/Handouts/POTUS/TRoos.html.
3. Subsequent to writing this article, I discovered that a similar argument has been
made by David FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: How To WIN THE
WAR ON TERROR 119-120 (Random House of Canada Ltd. 2003) ("[i]f possible
[the Roosevelt Corollary] possesses more relevance today than it did on the day
Roosevelt propounded it").
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against Canada would be considered an attack against the United States.
The same concept was embodied in article V of the Washington (or North
Atlantic) Treaty which gave birth to NATO in 1949: that an attack against
one member is considered an attack against all members of the Alliance.
The North American Air (and later Aerospace) Defence (NORAD)
agreement between the United States and Canada in 1958 created a com-
mon perimeter around the two countries against the threat of attacks by
Soviet bombers or missiles. A similar perimeter exists around the two
countries for purposes of controlling exports of sensitive technologies
outside the perimeter.
The interception of Ahmed Ressam on the Canada-U.S. border in 1999
and his cargo of explosives intended for the Los Angeles airport, brought
to the fore some American concerns about the lax administration of Ca-
nada's refugee policies. Partly as a response to the Ressam case and the
perceived increased threat of terrorist activities, former U.S. Ambassador
to Canada, Gordon Giffin, proposed a North American security perime-
ter in October 2000 as a means of stemming the flow of terrorism and
cross-border crime.4 That same year, Mexico's President Fox presented
his ideas for a North American Community, which were further elabo-
rated by Robert Pastor in 2001. 5
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 temporarily shut down the
Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. borders and plants on either side of the
borders that are dependent on the smooth flow of just-in-time parts
across the border. From a Canadian perspective, this has given added
impetus to the idea of deepening the NORAD security perimeter into a
much more comprehensive security perimeter, one that would enhance
physical security and also economic security. The question of whether
Mexico, which does not have a history of defence or police cooperation
with the United States, should be included in this security perimeter has
given rise to some disagreement among Canadian proponents of the con-
cept who do not want to be held up by trying to reach a trilateral agree-
ment rather than a bilateral one. But if and when Mexico decides it
wants to be involved in such a perimeter concept, few Canadian propo-
nents would oppose this, though there may be many Americans who
would.
In late November 2001, a group of Canadian and American business
people and academics issued a call for a North American "Zone of Confi-
4. Gordon Giffin, "Rethinking the Line: The Canada U.S. Border." Conference Re-
port, Oct. 22-25, 2000. POLICY RESEARCH INITIATIVE, HORIZONS, 5 Special Issue
Vol. 3, Mar. 2001, available at http://policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/Final v3_sunsetE.
pdf.
5. Robert A. Pastor, "Towards a North American Community Lessons from the Old
World for the New," Aug. 2001, available at http://bookstore.iie.com/merchant.
mvc?Screen=PROD&ProductCode=331. See also Robert A. Pastor, "North
America's Second Decade," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb.2004, at 124-35, which is a
refinement on his earlier proposals.
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dence" in a joint letter to President Bush and Prime Minister Chr6tien.6
The Smart Border Declaration and thirty-point Smart Border Action
Plan of December 6, 2001 between the two countries echoed this earlier
call for the establishment of a "Zone of Confidence" and have resulted in
a considerable degree of increased cooperation in the fight against terror-
ism, not only at the Canada-U.S. border, but also at many points far re-
moved from it.7 Certainly there are many elements of a perimeter
approach in the Smart Border process, but it has not been equated with a
true perimeter approach by either government. Proponents and oppo-
nents of the security perimeter approach appear to agree that we may be
embarking on a Fortress North America model in installments. Mexico
and the United States also reached their own bilateral "Smart Border"
agreement in late March 2002.8
The Canadian House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade recommended that the government study the impli-
cations of establishing a security perimeter around North America in its
December 2002 report.9 The Government's reply to this recommenda-
tion was ambivalent and ducked addressing the recommendation when it
said it was "committed to examining any options for improving operation
while providing appropriate security at the border." 10
Among the changes announced by Prime Minister Paul Martin the day
he assumed office, were the creation of a new Cabinet Committee on
Canada-U.S., chaired by the Prime Minister, to ensure an integrated, gov-
ernment-wide approach to Canada-U.S. relations and to be supported by
a Canada-U.S. Secretariat in the Privy Council Office; and the appoint-
ment of a Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister for Canada-U.S.
relations, Scott Brison.11 The Prime Minister also announced the crea-
tion of a new Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, to
integrate into a single portfolio the core activities of the existing Solicitor
General portfolio that secure the safety of Canadians and other activities
6. "Leaders from Canada and the United States Call for a Zone of Confidence Be-
tween the Two Countries," available at http://newsroom.msu.edu/site/indexer/856/
content.htm. See also CCEO Web-site, http://64.26.159.96/en/view/?document-id=
42&typeid=l.
7. Available at http://canadianembassy.orglborder/declaration-en.asp and at http://ca-
nadianembassy.org/border/actionplan-en.asp.
8. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet: Smart Border: 22 Point Agreement - U.S. -
Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan, Mar. 21, 2002, available at http://www.
state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8909.htm.
9. Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
December 2002, Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the
United States and Mexico, Recommendation 28, at 287. See also id. at 87-98, 171-
72, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/FAIT/Studies/Reports/
faitrp03/faitrp03-e.pdf.
10. Government Response to the Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs
and International Trade: Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's relations
with the United States and Mexico, at 32, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
tna-nac/documents/GovtResponse-en.pdf.
11. Office of the Prime Minister, Changes to Government Structure, Dec. 12, 2003,
available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/chgs-to-gov.asp.
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required to protect against and respond to natural disasters and security
emergencies; the creation of a Canada Border Services Agency to build
on the Smart Border Initiative and the important progress that has been
made in expediting trade and travel while enhancing security with respect
to high risk arrivals; and reforms to the refugee determination process to
create a more predictable and streamlined system, including a reformed
appointment process to ensure the quality and effectiveness of the Immi-
gration and Refugee Board. 12
Also announced on December 12, 2003 was the creation of a new posi-
tion of National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in the Privy
Council Office, to be responsible for intelligence and threat assessment
integration and interagency cooperation, and to assist the Minister of
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in the development and over-
all implementation of an integrated policy for national security and emer-
gencies.1 3 This appears to involve a much more limited approach to the
concept of national security than found in the National Security Strategy
of the United States, which is global in scope and application, and it ap-
pears to be more in keeping with the U.S. concept contained in its Na-
tional Strategy for Homeland Security. 14
The new Martin government promised to improve relations with the
United States, and the Prime Minister met with President Bush at the
Monterrey Summit of the Americas in January. In the February 4, 2004
Speech from the Throne, the only specific aspects of Canada-U.S. rela-
tions to be dealt with specifically were a general commitment for "a new,
more sophisticated approach to this unique [Canada-U.S.] relationship"
and a specific commitment
to ensure a border that is open and effective in handling the volumes
of people, goods, and services flowing to and from our economies,
the security concerns of both sides must be respected. Building on
the success of the Smart Borders initiative, the Government will en-
gage with the United States to further strengthen North American
security while facilitating the flow of commerce and travellers. It will
also work toward infrastructure investments at key trade corridors to
ensure that we can facilitate the expanding trade between our
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The Speech from the Throne said: "[g]iven the responsibility to address new
threats, such as non-state terrorism, and to ensure effective emergency manage-
ment, the Government will develop, with its domestic partners, Canada's first na-
tional security policy. This will publicly set forth the principles that will guide the
Government's actions and serve as a blueprint for effectively securing Canada in a
way that strengthens the open nature of our society." Available at http://www.pm.
gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.asp. The U.S. strategies are: (1) The National Security Strategy of
the United States, Sept. 18, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.
html; and (2) The National Strategy for Homeland Security: Office of Homeland
Security, July 16, 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/in-
dex.html. The Martin government's use of security policy also differs from that
used by the CIIA, as outlined in Behind the Headlines: Canada's Security Policies,
Vol. 60, No. 2, Jan. 2004, which focuses exclusively on defence related issues.
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countries.1 5
From one perspective, the closing of the border by the United States
after 9/11 was likened to the equivalent of the United States declaring a
trade embargo on itself. Another perspective suggested that it was clear
that for the United States security trumps trade. From another view-
point, trade and security are inextricably linked-there can be no eco-
nomic security without physical security; one cannot exist without the
other. Canadian nationalists have raised concerns that a meaningful se-
curity perimeter would inevitably mean a' loss of Canadian sovereignty
and a harmonization of Canadian immigration and refugee policies to
those of the United States.
This paper tries to examine the various elements involved in the con-
cept of a security perimeter or perimeters for the United States and its
two other North American partners, with particular emphasis on the Ca-
nada-U.S. relationship. It also examines the identifiable gaps in the se-
curity of all three countries, particularly in Canada and the United States;
the increased state of cooperation resulting from the bilateral "smart bor-
der" agreements between Canada, the United States, and Mexico as a
result of 9/11; and suggestions for future measures. It will also look at
links between security and trade, and what this could mean for a perime-
ter approach.
BACKGROUND
FEARS OF MANIFEST DESTINY OVERCOME BY
CANADA-U.S. DEFENCE COOPERATION
Historically, Canada and Mexico have been worried that the American
tendency towards "Manifest Destiny" was an attempt to swallow them
up. Mexico lost a lot of its territory to a bellicose United States in 1848
and uninvited U.S. troops were in the country in the early 20th century.
Canada lost the Alaskan panhandle in 1911 through arbitration and in the
first three decades of the 20th century was more preoccupied with estab-
lishing its own identity and independence from the United Kingdom than
anything else. Prime Minister Laurier was defeated in 1911 over the free
trade deal he had negotiated with the United States. In August 1938, on
the eve of World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt's acceptance
speech for an honorary Doctorate at Queen's University in Kingston, On-
tario included the following commitment: "The Dominion of Canada is
part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that
the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of
Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire. 1 6 Prime Minister Wil-
liam Lyon Mackenzie King, in response to President Roosevelt's pledge
to protect Canada, said "we too have obligations as a good and friendly
15. Speech from the Throne, Feb. 4, 2004, available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.
asp.
16. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address at Queen's University, Aug. 18, 1938, availa-
ble at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/7-2-188/188-09.html.
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neighbour and that enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way
either by land, sea or air to the United States cross Canadian territory. '17
Canada-U.S. defence cooperation from that time on has been intensive
and involved the creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence in
1940, which still exists today. 18
Roosevelt's pledge was not interpreted as a new twist on "Manifest
Destiny," but rather a commitment to defend Canada's territorial integ-
rity from attack. In effect it established a security perimeter around the
two countries. Since then, the defence of .the United States has meant the
defending of the North American continent. When America became an
atomic superpower in the postwar era, it extended its nuclear shield to its
northern neighbour. Canada's security is in the national interest of the
United States, and this has earned Canada a guarantee of automatic pro-
tection, a commitment that stands as the basis of Canadian defence policy
today. 19
NATO
Following World War II Canada became a charter member of both the
United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). While the UN was supposed to be a global security organiza-
tion, in effect, Canada and the other members of NATO relied on NATO
as the primary guarantor of their security throughout the period of the
Cold War. Article V of NATO provides that an attack against any mem-
ber is considered an attack against all. This established a security perime-
ter around all of NATO against outsiders, which was guaranteed by the
American nuclear deterrent. Article V was most recently invoked follow-
ing the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States on 9/11.
NORAD
In the 1950s the primary threat to North America was manned Soviet
bombers. To counter this threat, Canada and the United States set up the
North American Air Defence system, with a series of command posts
across North America and the building of three strings of radar lines
across Canada's northern territory, mainly by the U.S. Air Force.20 These
lines were replaced progressively by the North Warning System in 1993.
17. About Canada: Defending Canada, available at http://www.mta.ca/faculty/arts/ca-
nadianstudies/english/about/defending/#Protectorate.
18. The author sat on the PJBD as the External Affairs member from 1988 to 1990,
including the 50th anniversary celebrations in August 1990. At the time of the
Cuban missile crisis, the Canadian co-chair of the PJBD had written instructions
approved by Prime Minister Diefenbaker as to what he should say. In the interests
of maintaining friendly relations, he decided to relegate that responsibility to the
External Affairs member of his delegation.
19. About Canada: Defending Canada: A Great Power Protectorate, http://www.mta.ca/
faculty/arts/canadian-studies/english/about/defending/#Protectorate.
20. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Pine Tree
Line, available at http://www.rcaf.com/1946-1968_coldwar/stations/home/postwar_
canada radar-pinetree.htm.
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NORAD has a joint command structure and established a North Ameri-
can perimeter defence against instrusions from air and space. The Com-
mander in Chief is always an America and the Deputy Commander is
always a Canadian (a three star Air Force general).
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NORAD's role was more involved in
tracking potential drug smugglers using light aircraft from the Caribbean
and Latin America. NORAD also has a tracking capacity to identify al-
most immediately the precise origin of any missile launched from almost
anywhere. One of NORAD's current responsibilities is surveillance of
North American skies for terrorist activities. It is no longer dealing only
with intrusions into the North American aerospace perimeter, but also
with terrorist activities in the air inside North America. At the time of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a Canadian general was in charge at NORAD
headquarters in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado.
Following the 9/11 attacks the United States established Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), which is responsible for homeland defence
and civil support. While this is a purely national command, the Com-
mander of NORTHCOM is also the Commander of NORAD (i.e., he is
twin-hatted). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Commander of
NORAD was also Commander of U.S. Space Command, which is now a
separate command. Canada was not invited to join NORTHCOM, but a
joint planning unit located in NORAD Headquarters was established in
December 2002 to "enhance bi-national military planning, surveillance,
and to support civil authorities. 2 1 Its creation is an important step in the
post-September 11th evolution of Canada-U.S. security cooperation. The
Planning Group is tasked with preparing contingency plans, acting to pre-
vent and mitigate attacks, designing exercises, and conducting joint train-
ing programs. Its aim is to prevent future terrorist attacks on Canada or
the United States. It is also a forum to carry out a cooperative and well-
coordinated response to national requests for military assistance in rela-
tion to "terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or other major emergencies in
Canada or the United States. '2 2 The Planning Group is based at
NORAD Headquarters, and the head of the Planning Group is the Dep-
uty Commander of NORAD, with an assigned deputy from the other
country.23 The head of the Planning Group operates under the authority
of the Commander of NORAD.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE
Over the past twenty years, American proposals to build a sort of
"shield" or perimeter against attacks from ballistic missiles have proven
21. Department of National Defence (DND), Backgrounder: Canada-United States
Defence Relations.
22. DND, News Release, Canada and the U.S. Enhance Security Cooperation, Dec. 9,
2002, available at www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/viewnewse.asp?id=508.
23. Canadian Embassy in Washington D.C., Canada-U.S. Security Cooperation
Agreement, Dec. 9, 2002, available at http://www.canadianembassy.org/defence/
text-en.asp.
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to be hot potatoes in Canada. When Canada was asked to participate in
the Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) in 1984, the Mulroney Gov-
ernment said "no," but was prepared to see Canadian companies partici-
pate. At the time the Cold War was still on, and Canada did not want to
see the unraveling of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between
the two superpowers. The Bush Administration has announced that it
will deploy a system of national missile defence for the United States to
protect it against possible attacks by rogue states by the end of 2004, and
the United States has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty without much
reaction from the Russians.
The two Governments have also announced their intention to negotiate
an interim amendment to the current NORAD agreement to give Cana-
dian NORAD personnel access to critical Ballistic Missile Defence
(BMD) planning information until the system's deployment in October
2004.24 While some Canadians and Americans may regard such a system
as a high-tech Maginot Line, particularly in light of the terrorist attacks of
9/11, the system is being built. Some American generals have suggested
that if Canada did not agree to participate in the system, Canada would
not be protected by it. It is difficult to imagine a system, however, that
could protect Buffalo, New York without also protecting Toronto, Detroit
without also protecting south western Ontario, or Seattle without also
protecting Vancouver. The 80 percent of the Canadian population that
lives within 150 kilometers of the American border would appear to be
covered in any event.
The issue for Canada is, therefore, how to react to a fait accompli: ei-
ther participate and know what is going on, or stay out, be kept in the
dark, and perhaps see NORAD wither away. Such a system only makes
sense for Canada in a North American perimeter context, and while
thirty members of the Liberal caucus recently supported a Bloc
Quebecois motion to withdraw from talks on National Missile Defence
(NMD) with the United States, the government appears headed for even-
tual Canadian participation of some sort. In this case, the North Ameri-
can perimeter will clearly be established by the United States, whether or
not Canada is involved in the program. The DFAIT Web site has exten-
sive information on NMD and says: "[it is in Canada's strategic and na-
tional interest to be involved in decisions concerning the security and
defence of North America. ' 25 The 1994 Defence White Paper provided
for regular consultations on BMD with the United States and other
allies.26
24. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada and Ballistic Mis-
sile Defence, Jan. 15, 2004, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/
focus/bmd-en.asp.
25. Id.
26. DND, Canada-United States Relations, 1994 White Paper on National Defense,
ch. 5.
2005]
470 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 11
EXPORT CONTROL PERIMETER
During the Cold War most OECD countries tried to deny the transfer
of sensitive technologies to countries of the East Bloc or other communist
regimes through a system called the Coordinating Committee for Multi-
lateral Export Controls (COCOM). 27 In addition, the Canada-U.S. De-
fence Production Sharing Arrangement of 1956 and the Defence
Development Sharing Agreement of 1963 have allowed Canadian firms
to compete on an equal footing with their American counterparts in the
U.S. market and access sensitive technologies without export controls be-
tween the two countries.28 Export controls still apply to exports to third
countries. 29
These arrangements also allow Canadian firms to stay in touch with
developing technologies and help Canada generate and sustain high-tech-
nology jobs in the defence and civilian sectors. This is another form of a
North American security perimeter for a specific purpose. Tightening of
U.S. export controls in 1999 under the International Traffic in Arms Reg-
ulations (ITARs) required negotiations with Canada to restore the previ-
ous exemptions. Canada had to amend its export controls list to coincide
with the U.S. list and implement the Controlled Goods Registration Pro-
gram (CGRP).30 Richard Perle and David Frum note in their recent
book that, "the United States has had a defence free trade agreement
with Canada since 1958, and no important secrets seem to have been lost
as a result. '31
The NATO, NORAD, and export control examples demonstrate that
the concept of perimeter security against certain specified threats has
been practiced between Canada and the United States for over half a
century.
CIVILIAN COOPERATION: THE CROSS BORDER
CRIME FORUM
A similar pattern of extensive cooperation among civilian police agen-
cies exists in other areas and predates the tragic events of 9/11. For exam-
ple, the Cross Border Crime Forum (CBCF) was created in 1997 as a
bilateral consultative mechanism to address cross-border crime issues. It
has met every year since. The forum was originally created to tackle
smuggling across the eastern regions of both countries, but based on its
success in 1998 it was expanded to include the entire border and the par-
27. Michael Lipson, The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold War Export
Controls, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Winter 1999, at 33, available at http://cns.miis.
edu/pubs/npr/voO6/62/lipson62.pdf.
28. Text dated July 27, 1956, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/sell2USgov/
DPSA-e.pdf. Text dated Nov. 21, 1963, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
sell2USgov/DDSA-e.pdf.
29. DND Policy Group, 1994 White Paper on National Defence, ch. 5, available at
http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5117-e.htm.
30. Available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/sel12USgov/exportcontrols-en.asp.
31. FRUM & PERLE, supra note 3, at 252.
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ticipation of officials from across the border. The CBCF brings together
over 150 senior law enforcement, intelligence, and justice officials from
Canada and the United States. It has become a key action item of the
Smart Border Declaration. Officials meet over two days to share infor-
mation on best practices, report on progress, and discuss bi-national law
enforcement strategies and priorities. The work of the Forum, through its
subgroups on intelligence, cooperation, organized crime, prosecutions,
and mass marketing fraud, is ongoing throughout the year.
PROJECT NORTH STAR
Canada and the United States also agreed to reinvigorate Project
North Star, and it has been aligned with the CBCF since 2001. Project
North Star was initially created in 1989 as a voluntary means of coordi-
nating Canada-U.S. law enforcement efforts, with primary emphasis on
counter-drug activities along the Canada-U.S. border. It continues to
provide an orderly method for local, state/provincial, and federal law en-
forcement agencies and associations to voluntarily coordinate efforts so
as to expand and enhance multi-agency operations and avoid duplication
and accidental interference between independent operations. The aim is
to promote and improve local, regional, and coast-to-coast cross-border
networking, intelligence, targeting, prosecution, training, and coordinated
planning. This cooperation will also facilitate the exchange of "best prac-
tices" and effective utilization of assets and resources.
INTEGRATED BORDER ENFORCEMENT TEAMS (IBETS)
Canadian and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence cooperate on a
daily basis through the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET).
The IBET is a multi-agency law enforcement team that emphasizes a har-
monized approach to Canadian and U.S. efforts to target cross-border
criminal activity. There are six core partner agencies involved with the
IBET: RCMP, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S.
Coast Guard. Additional partners are municipal and provincial govern-
ments and law enforcement agencies.
The IBETs were originally developed in 1996 as an innovative method
to address cross-border crimes along international land and marine bor-
ders between British Columbia and the U.S. state of Washington. They
have since evolved into a major enforcement success. The IBETs have
effectively disrupted smuggling rings, confiscated illegal drugs, weapons,
liquor, tobacco, and vehicles, and made numerous arrests. The IBET in
British Columbia alone has averaged $1 million a month in seizures.
IBETs have also intercepted criminal networks attempting to smuggle il-
legal migrants across the border.
IBETs were identified as a key point in the thirty-point Action Plan of
the Smart Border Declaration, and more IBETs were established. Cur-
rently, IBETs cover every strategic location across the entire Canada-
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U.S. border. IBETs are already operating in the following border areas:
Pacific, Okanogan, Rocky Mountain, Prairie, Red River, Superior, De-
troit/Windsor, Niagara, Thousand Islands, St-Lawrence Valley Central,
Valleyfield, Champlain, Eastern, and Atlantic.
32
THE CANADA-UNITED STATES PARTNERSHIP (CUSP) OF 1999
In October 1999, Prime Minister Chr6tien and President Clinton con-
firmed guiding principles for Canada-U.S. border cooperation, which in-
cluded the need to streamline and harmonize border policies and
management; expand cooperation to increase efficiencies in customs, im-
migration, law enforcement, and environmental protection at and beyond
the border; and to collaborate on common threats from outside Canada
and the United States. CUSP was intended to "serve as a forum to pro-
mote an integrated, binational approach to border management and fos-
ter public dialogue and research on the border of the future. ' 33 Much of
the content of the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan stemmed
from the work of the CUSP and other pre-9/11 cooperation.
JOINT CANADA-UNITED STATES EFFORTS AT
COMBATING TERRORISM
The Smart Border Declaration outlined several ways that Canadian
and U.S. law enforcement officials and intelligence could cooperate on
preventing terrorist attacks. 34 These include the coordinated removal of
deportees, counter-terrorism legislation including measures for the desig-
nation of terrorist organizations, information sharing and advance infor-
mation on designated individuals and organizations if assets are frozen.
The Smart Border Declaration also provided for joint training and exer-
cises in order to increase the dialogue and commitment needed to imple-
ment the joint response to terrorism guidelines. Joint counter-terrorism
training and exercises are essential to building and sustaining effective
efforts to combat terrorism and to build public confidence. The creation
of the Binational Planning Group (see page 9 below) has enabled the two
countries to implement a framework for dealing with possible terrorist
attacks. 35
In 2001, the Canadian Aeronautics Act was amended to allow air carri-
ers to provide basic passenger and crew data to foreign governments.
32. For the most recent update on the status of the Smart Border Plan, see Press Re-
lease, Governor Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister Manley Issue One-Year Status
Report on The Smart Border Action Plan, Oct. 3, 2003, available at http://canadian
embassy.org/border/status-en.asp.
33. Available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/border2000/border2000.html.
34. Available at http://canadianembassy.orglborder/declaration-en.asp.
35. The most concise overview of Canada-U.S. cooperation can be found on the
DFAIT United States Relations Web site: Canada's Actions Since the September
11 Attacks, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?act=v&
mid=1&cat=10&did=1684. See also Gerald D. Chipeur and Dale Wm. Fedorchuk,
U.S.-Canadian Cooperation Against Terrorism: At the Border and Around the
World, (Sept. 4, 2002), http://www.chipewur.com.
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This has enhanced the ability of Canadian air carriers to work with their
international partners, particularly the United States, to take steps to-
wards further deterring and detecting terrorists.
The RCMP has also launched its Integrated National Security Enforce-
ment Teams (INSETs). These are multi-agency law enforcement teams
located in Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, and Ottawa. Through shared
federal, provincial, and municipal resources, the INSET members will be
better able to track and put a stop to the criminal activities (major or
minor offences) of terrorist groups or individuals who pose a threat to
Canada's national security. This type of increased capacity will enable
INSET members to work with their partners nationally and internation-
ally towards the common goal of detection and disruption of potential
terrorist threats.
The INSETs will allow the RCMP to work more closely with their na-
tional and international partners in the collection and sharing of vital in-
telligence at an earlier stage. These highly specialized teams will also
work to ensure that all the information collected is analyzed in a timely
and accurate manner and acted upon effectively.
RECENT PROPOSALS FOR A NORTH AMERICAN
SECURITY PERIMETER
In October 2000, the Policy Research Initiative of the Privy Council
Office and the Universities of British Colombia and Washington held a
major conference in Vancouver on "Rethinking the Line: the Canada-
U.S. Border." During the opening discussions, the then American Am-
bassador to Canada, Gordon Giffin, noted that border management poli-
cies were not being updated with the necessary speed to match trade
growth. He underlined the need for visionary steps to make the most of
the prosperity that free trade has initiated. But as the volume of cross-
border traffic increases, there was a concomitant need to take steps to
stem the flow of terrorism and cross-border crime. Giffin suggested con-
sidering a perimeter approach to border management, which would re-
quire Canada and the United States to harmonize many of their
standards and policies in an effort to create a continental border around
the two countries. The perimeter approach could be more efficient at
providing public safety. Other visionary steps, he noted, include con-
structing common border facilities, introducing the common training of
border officials, and standardizing the way in which Canada and the
United States collect and share data and process travelers and goods.36
During discussion at the conference, Marc-Yves Bertin, Policy Analyst
at the Privy Council Office noted that:
36. Gordon Giffin, Opening Plenary, Planning for the Future, HORIZONS: RETHINKING
THE LINE: THE CANADA-US BORDER, Special Issue Vol. 3, at 5 (Mar. 2001), avail-
able at http://policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/Final v3-sunset-E.pdf.
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the perimeter concept has captured the most media attention. It is
not entirely clear what a perimeter would mean: does the perimeter
approach suggest increased coordination and harmonization of
North American immigration and customs processes along North
America's internal and continental borders or does it refer to deeper
economic integration? Does a perimeter refer, as some journalists
have suggested, to a customs union?37
A perimeter approach also raises the question of membership. While
Mexico is a signatory to NAFTA, it is not a partner in the Canada-U.S.
security relationship as shaped by NATO and NORAD, the Shared Bor-
der Accord and Canada-U.S. Cross-Border Crime Forum. Would a pe-
rimeter approach include Mexico?38 Bertin also asked "should we
promote the idea of an International Joint Commission for the Canada-
U.S. border to help us prevent and resolve border disputes?" 39 Collabo-
ration on common threats from outside North America was a principle
which Bertin saw already enshrined in the Canada-U.S. Partnership
(CUSP) of October 1999.
Greg Goatbe, Director General of Canada Customs and Revenue
Agency, told the conference:
Canadians and Americans share certain standards and there is gener-
ally less risk associated with the entry of travelers and goods from
the United States across the Canada-US border as compared with
traffic coming from outside the North American perimeter. By fo-
cusing our efforts first on the perimeter borders, we should be able
to reduce the risk associated with travel and commerce flowing
across the Canada-U.S. border and in turn be able to explore even
more streamlined processes.
To achieve this goal, we need an agreement from our U.S. counter-
parts that there is a will to work towards common approaches at the
perimeter and harmonized processes at the Canada-U.S. border. If
customs processes at the Canada-U.S. border continue to lack har-
mony, low-risk importers and exporters and frequent travelers will
experience delays and costs in applying for and using the different
processes that exist on either side of the border.40
Demetrios Papademetriou of the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, "advanced a new vision of North America in which NAFFA
countries' international boundaries gradually, and perhaps unevenly, be-
come irrelevant, particularly with respect to the current security and reve-
nue collection objectives." He argued that this vision can and should be
attained
37. Marc-Yves Bertin, Seamless but Sovereign, HORIZONS: RETHINKING THE LINE:




40. Greg Goatbe, The Canada-US Border Initiative: A Retrospect, HORIZONS: RE-
THINKING THE LINE: THE CANADA-US BORDER, Special Issue Vol. 3, at 21, (Mar.
2001), available at http://policyresearch.gc.ca/doclib/Final v3 sunsetE.pdf.
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with no loss of sovereignty for any partner, while ensuring that dem-
ocratic processes are not only protected but also enhanced. Such a
vision could be approached from two distinct and ultimately con-
verging tracks. The first track is the continuance of building a multi-
plicity of contacts, the deepening of bilateral relationships and the
focus on pragmatic problem solving. The second would focus on the
kind of North America that citizens of the three countries have the
right to expect in the not too distant future and how to achieve it.
This includes their protection from unwanted activities, practices and
products as well as the advancement of citizen interests for prosper-
ity, protection of rights, adherence to rules and humanitarianism.41
FROM SECURITY PERIMETER TOWARD A NORTH
AMERICAN COMMUNITY?
Early in 2001, Mexican President Vincente Fox invited newly elected
President Bush to his ranch to discuss his ideas for a North American
Community, which included a common market for the free flow of goods,
services, capital, and people. Bush undertook to study the issue. In Au-
gust 2001 American scholar Robert Pastor took the Fox idea and tried to
flesh out the proposals in his book Towards A North American Commu-
nity: Lessons from the Old World for the New. 42 Pastor outlined a
blueprint for the integration of a developing country, Mexico, into North
America, noting that Fox's common market proposal "could not be im-
plemented anytime soon."'43
As a first step, Pastor proposed the creation of several trilateral institu-
tions to help facilitate the transition towards a North American Commu-
nity: a North American Commission to set the agenda for the political
leaders, a North American Parliamentary Group, a Permanent North
American Court on Trade and Investment, and meetings of cabinet minis-
ters with the agenda set by the North American Commission.44 He also
suggested the development of a North American Plan for Transportation
and Infrastructure45 and the creation of a common external tariff and a
customs union between the three countries.46
Pastor looked at the problems of customs, enforcement and immigra-
tion, the border, and the perimeter, and suggested the creation of a North
American Customs and Immigration Force to be used on the perimeter of
41. Canada-US Border Issues, HORIZONS: RETHINKING THE LINE: THE CANADA-US
BORDER, Special Issue Vol. 3, at 23, (Mar. 2001), available at http://policyresearch.
gc.cafdoclib/Final v3 sunsetE.pdf (summary of speaker Demetrios Papademe-
triou's session at the conference Rethinking the Line: The Canada-US Border).
42. Robert A. Pastor, Towards a North American Community Lessons from the Old
World for the New (Aug. 2001), available at http://bookstore.iie.comlmerchant.
mvc?Screen=PROD&ProductCode=331.
43. Id. at 98.
44. Id. at 100-03.
45. Id. at 104-08.
46. Id. at 108-11.
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North America where illegal goods and drugs are most likely to enter.47
Pastor also had some ideas about expanding the NAFTA visa program
and turning it into a North American passport for professionals and busi-
ness people who travel often in North America. 48 He also believed that a
North American energy policy and a North American Development
Bank to help Mexico catch up to its two developed North American part-
ners are required to build a North American community. Pastor noted
that the creation of a customs union between the three countries would
not be easy and the next step after that, the creation of a common market
with the free flow of labour, would even be more difficult.49 He cited a
Time magazine poll, which shows that Americans are not ready to tear
down the fences: "[i]ndeed they seem to be sitting on the fence on the
issue of Mexico."'50 Pastor also admitted that the trilateral approach
which he espouses for a North American community faces two major
problems: an American penchant for unilateralism; and the Canadian and
Mexican preference for bilateralism. 51 Pastor noted, "[the] concept of
sovereignty is one of the most widely used, abused and least understood
terms in the diplomatic lexicon."'52
FROM PERIMETER TO SMART BORDER
In November 2001 the Public Policy Forum organized a major confer-
ence in Toronto to discuss "Canada's Policy Choices: Managing Our Bor-
der with the United States."' 53 The issue of a security and/or economic
perimeter was discussed at this conference by several participants. Dep-
uty Prime Minister John Manley asked, "[w]orking together is it not pos-
sible to identify security risks before they come to the continent? If so,
this would mean working towards a greater convergence of policies and
procedures. '54
Joan Atkinson, Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy in Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, described her department's concept of "multiple se-
curity borders" or concentric rings from airline check-in (point of origin),
point of initial embarkation, transit, point of final embarkation, interna-
tional seaports/airports (point of arrival), and at the centre, the Canada-
U.S. border.55
A slight variation on this conception was offered by George Haynal,
Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who suggested creating a
"North American Area of Mutual Confidence" based on five concentric
47. Id. at 120-22.
48. Pastor, supra note 42, at 123, 132-33.
49. Id. at 143 -44.
50. Id. at 144.
51. Id. at 150.
52. Id. at 152.
53. Public Policy Forum (PPF), Canada's Policy Choices: Managing Our Border with
the United States, Nov. 27-28, 2001, available at http://www.ppforum.com/ow/ow-p-
112001Ajfrep.pdf.
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id. at 13.
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rings of cooperation: national security measure, cross-border coopera-
tion, cooperation at the actual border; offshore cooperation to prevent
the movement of potentially threatening individuals, and addressing the
global problems of migration. 56
Hugh Segal, president of the Institute for Research on Public Policy,
mentioned an integrated pre-clearance system and a continental point of
entry (CPE) as two possible solutions to avoid another crisis. "A CPE
agreement with regular review and renewal procedures that engaged the
standards and concerns both Canadians and Americans share would pro-
duce operational interoperability without compromising Canadian sover-
eignty and serve as a serious step ahead.
' 57
Perrin Beatty, president & CEO, Canadian Manufacturers and Export-
ers, argued that Canada can agree on common goals for stopping terror-
ism and promoting trade with the United States without compromising its
sovereignty. 58 Beatty also suggested that Canada should put forward a
concrete proposal outlining a Canadian plan that will secure North
America physically and economically. 59
Former American Ambassador to Canada, Gordon Giffin picked up on
his earlier idea of a security perimeter and pointed out that this debate
should take place within a continental context among the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. He indicated that public perception in the United
States is such that Americans are now just as concerned with the Canada-
U.S. border as they are about their border with Mexico. 60
Jim Stanford, economist with the Canadian Auto Workers, said that the
common security perimeter and harmonization of immigration and secur-
ity policies would undermine the extent to which the "Canadian way" can
be sustained. "Clearly, free trade can continue without the drastic step of
harmonizing immigration and security policies and therefore, no substan-
tial changes to current Canadian policies are required. '61
John Simpson, president of the American Association of Exporters and
Importers and former head of the U.S. Customs Service, noted, "[a]s long
as the traditional character of the border, specifically its revenue and reg-
ulatory function is unchanged, you in Canada who depend on trade with
the U.S. will be living on the edge of a volcano."' 62 He suggested that
creating a common external tariff (Customs Union) would create a free
trade zone, eliminating the administrative burden on traders and facilitat-
ing the flow of goods between Canada and the United States. He further
suggested that Canada and the United States should move their scarce
immigration control resources off the land border and re-locate them at
the relatively limited number of airports and seaports that serve as points
56. Id. at 50.
57. Id. at 17.
58. Id. at 16.
59. PPF, supra note 53, at 22.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Id. at 32-33.
62. Id. at 38.
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of entry into North America. Border immigration inspectors would prob-
ably have more success in locating terrorists at points of entry, and police
and immigration agents would probably be more successful in locating
terrorists already in North America.63
The Commissioner of the RCMP, Giuliano Zaccardelli, suggested that
to secure Canada and the United States, both countries must think in
continental terms and work together in their common security interests. 64
Peter Harder, the then Deputy Minister of the Department of Industry
and currently Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted that former Am-
bassador Giffin "had proposed the development of 'perimeter policies'
allowing 'more efficiency, yet enhanced security at the 49th parallel' at
one of their conferences in 2000," and Harder "stressed that if Canada
does not move to deal with the security issues that are now facing North
America, it will not be able to move on to the economic problems at the
border that existed prior to September 11."65 Harder then "pointed out
that as the common economic space shared by Canada and the United
States continues to evolve, policy-makers in Canada will have to address
some of the issues that former Ambassador Giffin called the 'post-
NAFTA challenge." 66
Harder suggested that the forum participants read Michael Hart and
Bill Dymond's paper from the Centre for Trade Policy and Law at Carle-
ton University entitled, "Common Borders, Shared Destinies: Canada,
the United States and Deepening Integration." He noted one of their
main conclusions was that "we have a perimeter with the U.S., defined by
geography, economics, shared values and common challenges - the issue
is not whether it exists but whether it is strong or weak." 67
The Canadian business community called for the creation of a conti-
nental security perimeter to exclude potential terrorists. "We have to
make North America secure from the outside," said the president of Ca-
nadian Pacific Ltd, "we're going to lose increasingly our sovereignty, but
necessarily S0.''68 The Coalition for Secure and Trade-Efficient Borders,
consisting of forty business groups from the manufacturing, transporta-
tion, and resource sectors, lent its support to the security perimeter idea,
as did the Canadian Chamber of Commerce.69
63. Id. at 39.
64. Id. at 45.
65. PPF, supra note 53, at 53.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 53-54. The Hart/Dymond paper is available at http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl.
See also Bill Dymond & Michael Hart, The Potemkin Village of Canadian Foreign
Policy, Policy Options, Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 43, available at http://www.irpp.org
("Reduced to its fundamentals, Canada is an integral part of the U.S. security and
economic perimeter").
68. Murray Campbell & Lily Nguyen, "Security Perimeter Backed," GLOBE AND
MAIL, Sept. 15, 2001, at A9.
69. Nancy Hughes Anthony, "US Border-Fears Vital for Canadian Business," CAL-
GARY HERALD, Oct. 15, 2001, at A10; Heather Scoffield, "Business Coalition
Pushes for Common Border Rules," GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 3, 2001, at B5.
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In November 2001, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade issued the report "Toward a Secure and Trade Effi-
cient Border," which included as a recommendation "that the Govern-
ment of Canada, following consultation with U.S. authorities, outline to
Canadians its plans for co-operating with its North American partners to
improve continental security. '70
U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR A SECURITY PERIMETER
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act, section 110 of which required all foreigners to
register when entering or leaving the United States. The provision was
aimed at Mexico, but Canada was included reportedly because legislators
feared protests from Hispanic-Americans if stronger action were taken
against Mexico than Canada. Concerned that the system would lead to
gridlock at the Canada-U.S. border, U.S. businesses, border state legisla-
tors, and Canadian authorities mounted a sustained lobbying effort to
overturn the provision. The lobby was successful but the incident
brought Canadian refugee policy under scrutiny. Canadian officials
floated the idea of a perimeter security system that would see the two
countries harmonize visa requirements and share intelligence
information.
As mentioned previously, the idea of a North American security perim-
eter was quickly picked up by American diplomats, notably Ambassador
Gordon Giffin and his successor Ambassador Paul Celluci, both before
and after 9/11. As elaborated by Celluci, the goal of a continental perim-
eter was to reduce the vulnerability of the North American continent
from asymmetric threats, cross-border crime, illegal immigration, cyber
crime, and particularly terrorism. Following the 9/11 attacks, Ambassa-
dor Celluci championed the perimeter plan: "We need to do a better job
at the perimeter in both countries-the documentation, the identity, the
screening. '71 He said the sovereignty of the countries does not have to
be compromised, and the plan would not require harmonizing immigra-
tion laws.72
The U.S. Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, Robert
Bonner, told a Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS) Con-
ference in July 2003 that urgent consideration should be given to what is
called "reverse inspections," a proposal that has stirred controversy in the
past. The proposal is very much in line with post-9/11 thinking in that
goods would be inspected before they crossed the border. The proposal's
main problems were national sovereignty issues and the need to give full
70. Thirteenth Report of the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Towards a Secure and Trade-Efficient Border, Nov. 2001, available at http://
www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/l/FAIT/Studies/Reports/sintrp05/07-for-e.htm.
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legal authority to officials acting on the other side of their national
boundary. He noted that the United Kingdom and France have success-
fully implemented such measures on either side of the Channel Tunnel.
He expressed frustration that this proposal appears to be languishing, sur-
mising that in the event of such an attack, the two governments would
implement reverse inspections in a second. Bonner also said there could
be the possibility of a secure perimeter and minimal checks on flows
within that perimeter.73
CANADIAN PREMIERS SUPPORT PERIMETER APPROACH
Several premiers came out in favour of a continental perimeter as pro-
posed by Ambassador Celluci. Ontario's Mike Harris, Bernard Lord of
New Brunswick, and British Columbia's Gordon Campbell all said they
would rather see the Canada-U.S. border remain as open as possible for
trade. Such a policy might require harmonizing customs and immigration
policies between the two countries, creating a common perimeter around
North America. Campbell even recruited Quebec Premier Bernard Lan-
dry as an ally in his campaign for a shared secure North American perim-
eter. During meetings with the British Columbian premier in Quebec
City, Landry offered his unqualified support for Campbell's call for a
continental security plan to ensure no interruption in business traffic. 74
PERIMETER CONCEPT REPLACED BY ZONE
OF CONFIDENCE
Deputy Prime Minister John Manley called the concept of a perimeter
"simplistic" on October 4, 2001. Manley rejected the security perimeter
approach, saying that he preferred to deal with "specific areas of con-
cern" rather than integrate Canada's policies with those of the United
States. "Working closely with the United States does not mean turning
over to them the keys to Canadian sovereignty," he said.75 Manley ad-
ded, "Perimeter implies NAFTA . . . I think it makes the problems,
whatever they are, much more complex if you try and do two borders at
once."'76 Following this statement, the use of the term "perimeter" by
Canadian and American officials went into hibernation, being replaced
by terms such as a "Zone of Confidence," "North American Commu-
nity," or even "security bubble." One commentator, Stdphane Roussel,
suggested that the idea of creating a North American security perimeter
put the Chr6tien government in some difficulty since it would be doing in
the security field what its predecessor had done in the economic field and
73. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Americas Program Confer-
ence Report, Safety and Security in North American Trade, July 2003, at 10, availa-
ble at http://csis.org/americas/canada/030716_Bonner.pdf.
74. CBC Online, Quebec Supports Campbell Security Plan, Oct, 19, 2001, available at
http://www.cbc.ca.
75. Paul Wells, We Don't Pull Our Weight: Manley, NATIONAL POST, Oct, 5, 2001, at
A6, available at http://www.csis.org/americas/pubs/pp0311barry.pdf.
76. Id.
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result in more formal integration with the United States.77 Roussel sug-
gested that the agreements Canada was reaching with the United States
were indeed going in the direction of a perimeter without using that
name. He believed that we must use the term perimeter since that is the
only way to ensure that a debate occurs on exactly what form the security
perimeter should take.
The Conference Board of Canada published a document on the border
and security in October 2001 which identified three options: (1) to en-
hance border efficiency by exploiting more intelligent methods of
processing border examinations; (2) to rethink the traditional border
management (Canada and U.S. law enforcement agencies would work
more closely together away from the Canada-U.S. border to mitigate the
need for intensive inspections at the border itself); and (3) for the two
governments to closely coordinate or perhaps even harmonize security
and related policies, and to potentially eliminate border inspections alto-
gether. He noted that, "[t]he situation requires clarity on the federal gov-
ernment's position on security and trade flow matters, recognizing their
interrelationships."7 8
THE SMART BORDER DECLARATION AND THIRTY POINT
ACTION PLAN
On December 12, 2001, Canada and the United States signed the Smart
Border Declaration: "Building a Smart Border for the 21st Century on
the Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence," and the
"Thirty Point Smart Border Action Plan," which contain many elements
of perimeter security even if it is not formally a full perimeter security
plan. The declaration noted that "public security and economic security
are mutually reinforcing ... and that by working together to develop a
zone of confidence against terrorist activity; we create a unique opportu-
nity to build a smart border for the 21st century. '79
The most recent update of the Smart Border Action Plan, issued on
October 3, 2003, included an announcement by the U.S. government that
Canadian and American citizens
would not be subject to the U.S.-VISIT program (entry-exit forms)
under current U.S. policy; and that the two countries have commit-
ted to working together to identify a way to implement thie program
77. Stephane Roussel, Le Canada et lePpgrimdtre de Scuritj Nord-Amgricain:
S~curit, Souverainet6 ou Prosp&itg, POLICY OprIONS POLITIQUES, Apr. 2002,
available at http://www.irpp.org.
78. Andrew Shea, Border Choices: Balancing the Need for Security and Trade, Confer-
ence Board of Canada, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/
boardwiseii/LayoutAbstract.asp?DID=61.
79. The Smart Border Declaration: Building a Smart Border for the 21st Century on the
Foundation of a North American Zone of Confidence, Ottawa, Dec. 12, 2001, avail-
able at http://canadianembassy.org/border/declaration-en.asp; Action Plan for Cre-
ating A Secure and Smart Border, Ottawa Dec. 12, 2001, available at http://
canadianembassy.org/border/actionplan-en.asp.
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that minimizes the impact on border flows and the need for exit in-
frastructure at the Canada-U.S. land border.
The then Homeland Security Secretary Ridge stated that
[A]s we continue to develop our U.S.-VISIT program, we need to
ensure that it will enhance our national security while not impeding
legitimate flows of trade and travel across our land border. Once
again, we are showing what can be accomplished through coopera-
tion and collaboration between our countries. By working together
we can better reach our common goals of ensuring the security and
prosperity of our citizens.80
This appears to indicate that the level of official U.S. concern about
holes in Canadian security posing a threat to the United States may be
somewhat less than some of the sources cited below suggest, and that the
level of confidence developed in the period since signature of the Smart
Border Action Plan in December 2001 has increased markedly. It may
also reflect the immense difficulties the United States would have in im-
plementing such an entry-exit system over the Canada-U.S. border.
A similar development with respect to short term visitors from Mexico
recently took place: President Bush and President Fox came to an agree-
ment on March 6, 2004 that Mexicans will not have to be photographed
or fingerprinted at the border for short visits to the United States.81 Ad-
ministration officials said that after security details are worked out, Mexi-
cans on seventy-two-hour visas will be exempted from the requirement
that anyone entering the country be photographed and fingerprinted.
One possible substitute security measure would be issuing the short-term
visitors a radio-frequency transponder similar to the EZPass toll-road de-
vice.82 President Bush's proposal to deal with illegal Mexican immigrants
has yet to be approved by Congress, and the President did not make any
predictions to President Fox or to reporters on the likely outcome.
CONTINUING SUGGESTIONS FOR A PERIMETER
In December 2001, Fred McMahon of the Fraser Institute supported
the perimeter idea and noted:
Canada's nationalist, anti-globalist left is up in arms about establish-
ing a North American perimeter. It's an affront to Canadian sover-
eignty, they say. But sovereignty does not belong to government.
Sovereignty belongs to individuals who entrust some aspects of it to
their government. The central sovereign duty a government owes its
80. PRESS RELEASE, Governor Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister Manley Issue One-
Year Status Report on the Smart Border Action Plan, Oct. 3, 2003, available at http:/
/canadianembassy.org/border/status-en.asp.
81. The White House, Press Conference of President Bush and Mexican President Fox,
Crawford Texas, Mar. 6, 2004, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2004/03/20040306-3.html.
82. Mike Allen, Bush, Fox Settle Short Term Visa Spat, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 7,
2004, at A09, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wo-dyn/articles/A36776-
2004Mar6.html.
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citizens is sound security and economic policy. Our left wants the
Canadian government to neglect its key sovereign duty to Canadian
citizens for economic and physical security, apparently because this
will somehow protect our sovereignty. If long-term enemies like
France and Germany can establish a common perimeter around Eu-
rope, surely long-term friends like Canada and the United States can
establish one in North America. 83
In February 2002, the Watson Institute for International Studies at
Brown University held a seminar on "The Re-bordering of North
America: Integration or Exclusion after September 11?," which discussed
the idea of a security perimeter or a Fortress America with very closed
borders on the north and south. Security was a new kind of trade barrier.
9/11 created a new politics of cross-border relations between the United
States and Canada and the United States and Mexico. Mexico was wor-
ried it would be on the outside of a security perimeter and Canadians
were worried by a Mexicanization of Canada-U.S. relations. Borders
were not disappearing, eroding, or being retired, but were being ex-
panded outward, reinvented, re-designed, and re-configured.8 4
In 2002, Stdphane Roussel presented four scenarios for a North Ameri-
can security perimeter at a CISS Conference on "Fortress North
America: What 'Continental' Security Means for Canada":
1) Formal Security Perimeter: a comprehensive treaty that defines the
long-term goals and guarantees the decision-making process be-
tween the members of the security agreement. The advantage is
that it is a long-term guarantee to all parties. The problem is that no
one in Canada wants to talk about this, and there is a reluctance to
create new bureaucracies. Models: Schengen, Permanent Joint
Board of Defence and International Joint Commission.
2) Informal/Limited Security Perimeter: a sectoral memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between agencies (no formal treaty or or-
ganization). This is the most likely scenario because it is the least
troublesome and is the way in which most Canada-U.S. relations are
conducted. The problem with this scenario is that dealing with ter-
rorism requires a comprehensive approach since there are a lot of
organizations involved and a coordination mechanism is needed.
Model: December 12th Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan.
3) Multilateral Security Perimeter: this is a wider agreement that is ei-
ther formal or informal. But according to Roussel it will not work
because there are no historical examples of success. Models: UN
Conventions, NATO, G7/8.
83. Fred McMahon, Fraser Institute, Perimeter Puzzle, Dec. 2001, available at http://
oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/forum/2001/12/section_13.html.
84. The Watson Institute for International Studies, Transcript, The Re-Bordering of
North America: Integration or Exclusion After September 11?, available at http://
www.watsoninstitute.org/news-detail.cfm?ID=38.
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4) Unilateral "made-in-Canada" Security Perimeter: more coherent
and coordinated national policies that are enough to reassure the
United States. Models: bill C- 32 and C-42.85
Roussel believed that the most likely scenario was the second, since it
is the easiest to implement. But he considered the first scenario as the
most efficient and useful for Canadians.
Bob Keyes of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce outlined the ideas
of the Coalition for a Secure and Trade Efficient Border with respect to
perimeter security. The Coalition envisions the North American "space"
as three concentric circles: (1) the largest circle, where offshore North
American goods and people enter our economic system; (2) the middle
circle, the first point of entry into North America; and (3) the innermost
circle, the actual Canada-U.S. border. Keyes argues for increased infor-
mation sharing and cooperation. He wants to move the "border away
from the border," without eliminating the Canada-U.S. border. He also
believes that addressing the border issues means tackling larger ques-
tions. In the short term, he sees perimeter cooperation on a bilateral ba-
sis with the United States and not trilateral with Mexico. 86
Doug Lewis stated that harmonizing our immigration and refugee poli-
cies is an affirmation of our sovereignty since, "we go to the table and
make decisions for ourselves. '87
DOUBTS ABOUT A SECURITY PERIMETER
In February 2002, Stephen Clarkson, a participant in the Watson Insti-
tute seminar, wrote that like in the Cold War, Canada finds itself sitting
directly on its superpower neighbour's defence perimeter. He noted that
the United States needs to be "confident Canada is doing all that it can
and that Canadian procedures need to be seen as effective as possible."
So what was Canada to do? One extreme, which he opposed, was the
complete harmonization of all policies. An intermediate position he
presented was the harmonization of select sectors, such as vetting applica-
tions for immigration. But according to Clarkson, "Canadian procedures
seem to be more effective at screening out terrorists than American
ones.'" 88 He also feared the talk of merging personnel such as immigra-
tion or intelligence because of job loss. He claimed that Congress can be
85. St6phane Roussel, The Blueprint of Fortress North America, in FORTRESS NORTH
AMERICA: WHAT 'CONTINENTAL SECURITY' MEANS FOR CANADA 16-17 (David
Rudd & Nicholas Fumeaux, eds. 2002).
86. Bob Keyes, Perimeter Security and Trade Issues for Canadian Businesses, in FOR-
TRESS NORTH AMERICA: WHAT 'CONTINENTAL SECURITY' MEANS FOR CANADA
36 (David Rudd & Nicholas Fumeaux, eds., 2002).
87. Doug Lewis, What Perimeter Security Means for Canada, in FORTRESS NORTH
AMERICA: WHAT 'CONTINENTAL SECURITY' MEANS FOR CANADA 36 (David
Rudd & Nicholas Fumeaux, eds., 2002).
88. Stephen Clarkson, Lockstep in the Continental Ranks: Redrawing the American
Perimeter After September 11, at 11, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Feb.
2002, available at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/NationalOffice_
Pubs/clarkson.pdf
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expected to generate continual turbulence of the state of the U.S. security
perimeter. Clarkson wrote that, "if Fortress North America surrounds
U.S. borders and there was a return to isolationism, Canada and Mexico
will be in trouble." After 9/11, we were seeing a double dialogue between
Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. NAFTA, according to Clarkson, has little
to offer to further political integration.8 9
If from the ashes of Ground Zero a new Fortress America were to be
constructed, the issue for both Canada and Mexico becomes where
its ramparts will be located. If these customs and immigration fortifi-
cations are to be a new Hadrian's Wall along the United States' terri-
torial boundaries, then the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes and
the Rio Grande will become the moats across which the two periph-
eral states look in tortured frustration at their once-promised
markets.90
Clarkson concluded:
for North America, we cannot tell whether its integration will be
deepened by a trilateral consensus on securing the continent against
terrorism, or whether the United States' borders will be raised so
high that its two neighbouring states will find themselves outside the
fortress, with their NAFTA-accelerated vulnerability turned to their
devastating disadvantage, or-more likely- whether the continent
will be managed as two separate U.S. controlled relationships.9 1
In September 2002, Dr. David Charters told a conference of the Cana-
dian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute that it was essential to allevi-
ate American concerns about the supposedly "porous" border and
Canada's allegedly "lax" immigration/refugee policies because of the eco-
nomic repercussions for Canada. He noted it was hardly surprising that
border security was featured more prominently than defence in the
budget and in initiatives that followed.92 He did not, however, advocate a
security perimeter. While it might make sense from a practical stand-
point, "the sovereignty 'optics' are unsellable, even if they are over-
stated. '93 Joint border patrols and information-sharing are now accepted
practice, but that was a long way from posting American customs and
immigration officers alongside their Canadian counter-parts, "looking
over their shoulders and vetting all arrivals. '94 According to Charters,
"the most the US can expect-indeed, what it has the right to expect-is
that Canada will exercise 'due diligence' within its own territory and juris-
dictions to ensure that its border controls, refugee, immigration, and
89. Id.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Dr. David A. Charters, Terrorism and Response: The Impact of the War on Terror-
ism on the Canadian-American Security Relationship, CANADIAN DEFENCE AND
THE CANADA-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 5-6 (Sept. 2002); Canadian Defence
and Foreign Affairs Institute, at 13, available at http://www.cdfai.org.
93. Id. at 16.
94. Id.
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other policies and procedures limit as much as is reasonably possible the
ability of terrorists to infiltrate Canada and to use it as a base for attacks
against the United States. '95
WENDY DOBSON'S STRATEGIC BARGAIN
In April 2002, Wendy Dobson published her framework for "Shaping
the Future of North American Economic Space," the first of a series of
Border Papers published by the CD Howe Institute which suggested that
Canada should initiate a joint strategy for achieving a common goal of
North American physical and economic security. 96 Dobson argued that
Canada needed a proactive security agenda to deal with the post-9/11
challenges at the Canada-U.S. border, which also dealt with the issues of
immigration/refugee policy and anti-terrorism and defence policy. She
suggested the need for a "Big Idea" to seize the attention of the U.S.
government and offered three options: (1) a customs union, (2) a com-
mon market, or (3) a "strategic bargain" of a pragmatic mix of customs-
union-like and common-market-like proposals plus Canadian initiatives
in areas of particular interest to the Americans (security, including refu-
gee administration and visitor visa administration, and defence). She did
not use the terminology of North American security perimeter, but all of
her proposals would certainly establish a perimeter for both physical and
economic security purposes.
ALLAN GOTLIEB'S NORTH AMERICAN
COMMUNITY OF LAW
Allan Gotlieb, former Canadian Ambassador to the United States,
came out in support of Dobson on September 11, 2002, with an article in
the National Post entitled "Why Not a Grand Bargain with the United
States." He developed this further in a proposal for a North American
Community of Law, in which he said the time is right to consider striking
a grand bargain in which issues of economic security and homeland secur-
ity are brought together in such a way as to elicit broad political support
in both countries. 97 Gotlieb suggested that:
it is possible to envisage the negotiation of a comprehensive agree-
ment establishing a common set of binding rules favouring the move-
ment of people, services and goods within a joint Canada-U.S. space.
It could also establish a common perimeter surrounding the space,
with common criteria for entering and moving within it. There could
be a common external tariff for the two countries with regard to a
substantial body of goods entering the space. Common standards, or
95. Id.
96. Wendy Dobson, Shaping the Future of North American Economic Space, CD
Howe Commentary No. 162, Apr. 2002, available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/
commentary_162.pdf.
97. Allan Gotlieb, A North American Community of Law, at 7, available at http://
www.alanalexandroff.com/gotlieb2.pdf.
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reciprocal recognition of each other's, could be adopted to avoid reg-
ulatory harassment and hidden barriers to trade.98
Gotlieb noted that:
a common security fence would require tight cohesion in all areas
related to enforcement and intelligence. But it would not restrict our
sovereign ability to determine the basic rules of immigration policy:
i.e., how many immigrants we would take annually, where they come
from, what would be the size of the independent class, what qualifi-
cations were needed, what people would be included in the family
class and who excluded. As for refugees, both countries acknowl-
edge and accept the same basic international definitions and legal
obligations. As to contributing far more to the joint defence of our
perimeter and playing an effective role, this again could hardly con-
tribute to the diminution of our sovereignty. We have long partici-
pated in joint arrangements with the [United States] for our common
defence in North America and elsewhere. If we do significantly
more, we increase our voice and influence. If we do less, we dimin-
ish our sovereignty - a strange position for Canadian nationalists to
advocate. 99
Hugh Segal, President of the IRPP, supported Dobson's call for a stra-
tegic bargain in a National Post article on November 18, 2002, entitled
"Toward a Treaty of North America." In December 2002, at a Confer-
ence in Washington, D.C. to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the
signing of NAIFTA, former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney supported the
concept of a security perimeter when he said "our internal borders will
only be smart if our external perimeter is secure." 10 0 Mulroney also
called for action to heighten vigilance and direct concrete action which
gives all of North America more certainty against the unprecedented
threat of terrorism. 10 1
MEXICO AND THE PERIMETER
A Mexican perspective on perimeter security was published in 2002 by
Mauricio Ibarra, Embassy of Mexico in Canada. He wrote that "when
President Fox visited the [U.S.], he proposed the establishment of a secur-
ity policy for the entire NAFTA region. It is the logical next step after
NAFTA and would be focused on drug trafficking, organized crime and
terrorism and not joint military action. ' 02
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Canadian Press, Mulroney Calls on PM to Back Perimeter Security, Dec. 10, 2002,
available at http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CrVNews/1039481322310
82?sname=&noads=.
101. NAFTA at 10: Progress Potential and Precedents, Woodrow Wilson Centre, Wash-
ington, D.C., Dec. 9-10, 2002, available at http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction
='events.event_summary&event-id=12418 and http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/Article
News/story/CTVNews/1039481322310_82?s name=&no ads=.
102. Mauricio Ibarra, Embassy of Mexico in Canada, Perimeter Security: A Mexican
Perspective, FORTRESS NORTH AMERICA: WHAT 'CONTINENTAL SECURITY'
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THE CCCE'S NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY AND
PROSPERITY INITIATIVE (NAPSI)
In January 2003, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE)
published its North American Security and Prosperity Initiative
(NAPSI), 10 3 which linked physical and economic security and called on
the three countries of North America "to create a zone of cooperation
encompassing the continent rather than focusing security efforts on the
line that separates us. We must emphasize protection of the approaches
to North America while eliminating regulatory, procedural and infra-
structure barriers at our internal border. '104
The CCCE suggested the need to transform the internal border into a
shared checkpoint within the Canada-U.S. economic space. The objec-
tive should be twofold: to shift the burden of protecting our countries
against global threats away from the internal border to the approaches to
North America; and to eliminate unnecessary regulatory, procedural and
infrastructure barriers at our internal border."' 0 5 To achieve this objec-
tive, the CCCE advocated:
A shared system for commercial processing, shared infrastructure,
shared policing and even a voluntary shared North American identi-
fication document all could help to ease flows of people and goods
across the border further without threatening the security or sover-
eignty of either country.... Similarly, a shared approach to protect-
ing legitimate visitors to North America could serve as the model for
multilateral cooperation while maintaining sovereignty and the dis-
tinctiveness of policies related to receiving immigrants who are vital
to our societies and of refugees to whose protection we are equally
committed. Building on the more than forty-year record of coopera-
tion through NORAD, our countries should strive to create a North
American defence community of sovereign nations. The new part-
nership would expand our commitment to include:
* Defence of the continent's airspace, including participation in a con-
tinental ballistic missile defence system;
" Shared protection of the maritime approaches to North America;
* Protection of critical infrastructure such as pipelines, electronic net-
works, railways, bridges and transmission lines; and
" Cooperative reaction to natural and man-made disasters on both
sides of the border. 10 6
MEANS FOR CANADA 36 (David Rudd & Nicholas Fumeaux, eds., 2002). See also
Stephen Clarkson & Maria Banda, Congruence, Conflict, and Continental Govern-
ance: Canada's and Mexico's Responses to Paradigm Shift in the United States,
2003, available at http://www.alanalexandroff.com/canmex.pdf.
103. CCEO, North American Security and Prosperity Initiative (NASPI), available at
http://64.26.159.96/en/north/north.php.





OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN 2003
In February 2003, the Conference Board of Canada presented a seven-
point plan for renewing Canada-U.S. relations. 10 7 It argued against "big
ideas" for the Canada-U.S. relationship. Instead, it urged that issues be
addressed in an incremental and pragmatic manner. They thought that
initiatives such as the Smart Border Declaration should be expanded, and
they encouraged security cooperation. Police and security forces in both
countries must be encouraged to cooperate more closely to deal with
common security risks. Canada should also seek to remove the border as
a barrier to the free movement of people between countries and explore
opportunities for a common external tariff on manufactured goods that
will reduce costs for both business and government.
In March 2003, Simon Fraser University Professor Alexander Moens
wrote that pressure will build on Ottawa to develop a comprehensive
North American Security and Defence Agreement (NASDA). He ar-
gued that it was in Canada's interest to create a comprehensive, rules-
based relationship in security and defence that pre-empts disputes or uni-
lateral action by the United States.10 8 Moens predicted it was "probable
that Canada will ultimately recognize that its future is in North America,
and will begin to fit more comfortably inside a North American eco-
nomic, political, and military context. Canada as a sovereign nation will
survive this latest hurdle as it has the previous ones. In terms of security
and prosperity, the Canadian people will come out ahead.' 10 9
In the April 2003 edition of Policy Options, IRPP's Daniel Schwanen
published an article skeptical about any kind of "grand bargain," entitled
"Let's Not Cut Corners Unbundling the Canada-U.S. Relationship."110
He suggested focusing on addressing the security issue without linking it
directly to economic security: "The current security-related crisis in the
United States must be addressed head-on and in a positive way, helping
to solve not only any objective U.S. problems with security risks, but also
dealing pro-actively with any perception of problematic Canadian trust-
worthiness as a security partner." ' Schwanen said there was "no need
for Canadians and Americans to adopt each others laws-or foreign pol-
icy-for the sake of harmonization. Rather the issue is making sure that
any negative impact on a neighbouring country is taken into account and,
more than incidentally, that the North American security burden is
107. Charles A. Barrett & Hugh Williams, Renewing the Relationship: Canada and the
United States in the 21st Century, Conference Board Briefing, Feb. 2003, available
at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/boardwiseii/LayoutAbstract.asp?DID=512.
108. Alexander Moens, The Coming North America Security and Defence Agreement,




110. Daniel Schwanen, Let's Not Cut Corners in Unbundling the Canada-US Relation-
ship, POLICY OPTIONS, Apr. 2003, available at http://www.irpp.org/po/index.htm.
111. Id. at 19.
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shared appropriately. 1 12 Schwanen suggested that one possibility to be
examined would be a North American equivalent to the European
Schengen Agreement (Schengen came after the European Union trans-
formed itself from a customs union to a common market and then an
economic union).
In October 2003, Stephen Clarkson and Maria Banda published an as-
sessment of Canadian and Mexican reactions to the paradigm shift in U.S.
attitudes resulting from 9/11.113 They also published a very similar paper
assessing the impact of the Bush doctrine on Canada. 114 They point out
that Canada and Mexico are the only two countries in the world engaged
in an "intermestic" relationship with the United States and that despite
all the pressures to converge after 9/11, "the two peripheries retained
their respective paradigms to varying degrees and at different
junctures." 15
THE CIIA'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAUL MARTIN'S
FOREIGN POLICY
In the fall of 2003, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs
(CIIA) held a conference in Ottawa on foreign policy issues for the new
prime minister. The results of the conference were published in the Au-
tumn 2003 issue of the CIIA's International Journal (circulated in Febru-
ary 2004), in an article entitled "Foreign Policy for Paul Martin." Denis
Stairs suggests that 9/11 made it politically possible for the political and
economic mandarinate in Ottawa to proceed more expeditiously with
"seamless border" initiatives. "A newly conceived and broadly negoti-
ated framework within which to stabilize and govern the Canada-U.S. re-
lationship - a framework coupled to the idea of some sort of common
defence perimeter - promises a tempting dose of relief.11 6 Stairs doesn't
believe that a Liberal government would want to "embark on so bruising
an initiative, given the upheaval that would certainly result. '117
William Watson's contribution to the same issue of International Jour-
nal favours the "aggressive incrementalism" approach to the border es-
112. Id. See also Schwanen's earlier article, After Sept. 11: Interoperability with the U.S.,
Not Convergence, POLICY OPTIONS, Nov. 2001, available at http://www.irpp.org/po/
index.htm.
113. Stephen Clarkson & Maria Banda, Congruence, Conflict, and Continental Govern-
ance: Canada's and Mexico's Responses to Paradigm Shift in the United States,
AMERICAN REVIEW OF CANADIAN STUDIES 2003, available at http://www.alanalex-
androff.com/canmex.pdf.
114. Stephen Clarkson & Maria Banda, Paradigm Shift or Paradigm Twist? The Impact
of the Bush Doctrine on Canada, Centre for Research on Latin America and the
Caribbean, Oct. 2003, available at http://www.yorku.ca/cerlac/deep-papers/Clark-
son-Banda.PDF.
115. Clarkson & Banda, Congruence, Conflict, and Continental Governance: Canada's
and Mexico's Responses to Paradigm Shift in the United States, at 23.
116. Dennis Stairs, Challenges and Opportunities for Canadian Foreign Policy in the
Paul Martin Era, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Vol. LVIII No. 4, Autumn 2003, at
495.
117. Id. at 496.
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poused by Robert Wolfe.' 1 8 Watson further elaborates by suggesting that
"working diligently with the U.S. border bureaucracy on the mundane
agenda of permanent regulatory reform probably holds greater promise
of success than trying to attract the attention of the U.S. Congress with a
Big Idea that, in its negotiation, might well be altered beyond
recognition."'1 19
Douglas A. Ross in the same issue of the International Journal looks at
Canada's security policy options through very critical eyes. He rails the
foreign policy review process as "having become an exercise that system-
atically deflects attention away from policy substance towards the essen-
tially superfluous domain of image, status, and self-congratulation. It is
not 'easing a democratic deficit' or 'enhancing mass participation' in the
framing of effective foreign policy. Denis Stairs fairly summed up the
current "values" oriented approach of DFAIT that publicizes the "Cana-
dian way" by noting that "in foreign policy, as in some other dimensions
of life, an ostentatious claim to superior virtue can be the last refuge of
the impotent. '120 Among the suggestions Ross makes for a new security
policy includes the following: "[t]he security threats posed by chaotic im-
migration and refugee policies must be corrected immediately, and vastly
improved perimeter security measures should implemented
immediately."' 121
St6phane Roussel's contribution to the special edition of the Interna-
tional Journal analyzes what Paul Martin has said and done so far on
relations with the United States. He concludes that Martin has embraced
the need for a Canadian counterpart to "Homeland Defence" without
employing the word, and that Martin's strategy of rapprochement "con-
sists of a vast exchange of good procedures: make concessions on security
matters to obtain gains (or at least, maintain the status quo) in the eco-
nomic field."12 2 Roussel believes this later strategy could hold the great-
est risks: (1) Americans seem satisfied with the measures adopted by the
Canadian government since 9/11, and you do not gain a neighbour's grati-
tude by solving a problem he does not consider urgent; (2) a strategy of
linking security and trade is not in Canada's interests, and Canada "can-
not win at this game;" (3) the gains that Canada could make by allowing
concessions on security could be cancelled by a slowdown in the econ-
omy; (4) creating a national security strategy for Canada constitutes an
immense Pandora's box; and (5) the initiative appears conceived not as a
means to ensure Canada's security (which should be their primary out-
118. William Watson, International Economic Policy for a New Liberal Government,
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Vol. LVIII No. 4, Autumn 2003, at 530-31.
119. Id. at 531.
120. Douglas A. Ross, Canada's International Security Policy in an Era of American
Hyperpower and Continental Vulnerability, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Vol. LVIII
No. 4, Autumn 2003, at 550.
121. Id. at 569.
122. Stdphane Roussel, Honey Are You Still Mad at Me? I've Changed, You Know...:
Canada-U.S. relations in a Post-Saddam/Post Chritien Era, INTERNATIONAL JOUR-
NAL, Vol. LVIII No 4, Autumn 2003, at 571-90.
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come), but as a way of attracting the favour of Washington. 12 3
CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS IN 2003
2003 "was a tumultuous year with the tensions of the Iraq war spilling
into public differences between Canada and the United States, and ten-
sions inside Canada between the Government and those who thought it
had lost its bearings on relations with the United States. The transition in
Ottawa was much longer than normal as Prime Minister Chrdtien prom-
ised to stay until February 2004. But progress on the Smart Border Dec-
laration and Action Plan continued unabated and Canadians arriving in
the United States by air or sea from abroad were not required to fill out
the new second form which all other nationalities are required to
complete.
The leadership change happened sooner than Chr6tien promised and
some of the first changes announced by Prime Minister Martin on the day
he was sworn in related to:
creating a Canada Border Services Agency to build on the Smart
Border Initiative and the important progress that has been made in
expediting trade and travel while enhancing security with respect to
high risk arrivals, and continue to work in close collaboration with
business, labour, immigrant and refugee groups, and other important
stakeholders in pursuing these changes; and reforming the refugee
determination process to create a more predictable and streamlined
system, including a reformed appointment process to ensure the
quality and effectiveness of the Immigration and Refugee Board. 124
He also announced creating a new position of National Security Advi-
sor to the Prime Minister in the Privy Council Office to be responsible for
intelligence and threat assessment integration and interagency coopera-
tion and to assist the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Prepared-
ness in the development and overall implementation of an integrated
policy for national security and emergencies. 125
SECURITY IN THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE
FEBRUARY 2004
The new Martin government's Speech from the Throne in February
2004, said that:
to ensure a border that is open and effective in handling the volumes
of people, goods, and services flowing to and from our economies,
the security concerns of both sides must be respected. Building on
the success of the Smart Borders initiative, the Government will en-
gage with the United States to further strengthen North American
security while facilitating the flow of commerce and travellers. It will
123. Id. at 586-88.




also work toward infrastructure investments at key trade corridors to
ensure that we can facilitate the expanding trade between our
countries.126
CRITICS OF THE PERIMETER CONCEPT
Many Canadian and some American observers have criticized the se-
curity perimeter concept, particularly when it is linked to a "big idea" or
"strategic bargain." Some of those criticisms have been mentioned
above. Canadian nationalists fear that it would mean a loss of sover-
eignty and a need to adopt of U.S. policies many areas including immigra-
tion and refugee policy. They believe that Canada would loose its ability
to conduct economic relations with third parties and that Canada-U.S.
free trade can continue without the establishment of a security
perimeter.127
Other critics believe that while a security perimeter might prove bene-
ficial in the very long run, it will be unpalatable to many Canadians in the
short run. The creation of a security perimeter would involve a major set
of trade offs "that could have unintended and harmful consequences for
Canadians long after the American-led 'war on terror' has been won. '128
It is interesting to note that one of the authors of that statement, Jack
Granatstein, said only ten days earlier in a major speech to the CD Howe
Institute that:
a security perimeter around North America-with Canada inside the
tent-will likely become essential if terrorism is not smashed soon.
Those who argue the 'Big Idea,' a major and comprehensive eco-
nomic and security package with the United States make precisely
this point and push it even further. Canada faces hard choices, and
the decisions must be based on Canada's interests. 129
Lloyd Axworthy, former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, worries
that increased defence cooperation of Canadian land and sea forces with
the United States will have "major consequences for our own territorial
integrity.' 130 He also believes that Canadian adherence to National Mis-
126. Speech from the Throne, Feb. 2, 2004, available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/sft-ddt.
asp.
127. See Murray Dobbin, Zip Locking North America: Can Canada Survive Continental
Integration, Council of Canadians, available at http://www.canadians.org/docu-
ments/ZipLockingNA.pdf; Maude Barlow, The Canada We Want: A Citizen's Al-
ternative to Deep Integration, Council of Canadians, available at http://www.
canadians.org/documents/TCWW-eng.pdf.
128. Denis Stairs, et al., In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure
World, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Oct. 30, 2003, at17, availa-
ble at http://www.cdfai.org/PDF[In%20The%20National%201nterest%2OEnglish.
pdf.
129. Jack Granatstein, The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada's Na-
tional Interests through Tighter Ties with the U.S:, Benefactors Lecture 2003, CD
Howe Institute, Oct. 21, 2003, available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdflbenefactors-
lecture_2003.pdf.
130. LLOYD AXWORTHY, NAVIGATING A NEW WORLD: CANADA'S GLOBAL FUTURE 92
(Knopf Canada, 2003).
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sile Defence would "fundamentally alter our position as a leading nation
on the control and elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weap-
ons and constitute a retreat from protecting people against the threat of
mass destruction." 131 He worries that "if the undefended border is now
to be subsumed into a North American security fortress dominated by the
imperatives of homeland defence, then a very different model appears,
with sobering lessons for all those countries who are struggling to con-
struct political space for themselves in proximity to bigger, stronger na-
tions."'1 32 He suggests that Canada should define the border security
issue "in the mode of a community, not a fortress,"' 3 3 "... a community
that would encourage the retention of each country's individuality
through structures with set rules and rights."' 34
James Laxer, longstanding nationalist and member of the NDP "Waffle
Group," says that 9/11 has forced a fundamental choice on Canadians:
whether to be inside the perimeter of the security fortress being con-
structed by the United States; or to maintain our border, to choose to
sustain a sovereign Canada, separate from the United States. 135 Laxer
claims that in its pre-9/11 version, the idea of Fortress North America was
a business agenda to eliminate the borders within the continent and to
allow full mobility of persons in North America. After 9/11, the idea be-
came both a business and a security agenda. 136 Laxer faults the propo-
nents of a security perimeter for not recognizing that an open border with
the United States "would raise serious security concerns for Canada," in-
cluding importing "the American gun culture into Canada, something
most Canadians strongly oppose."' 37 Laxer believes that while the Chr6-
tien government refused the concept of Fortress North America and of a
more integrated military, in fact the two countries "are proceeding to-
ward Fortress North America, but on the instalment plan."' 38 Laxer says
that:
Canadians are united around the goal of preventing terrorists from
gaining access to Canada, either for purposes of launching attacks
against domestic targets or to use this country as a launch pad for
cross border attacks against U.S. targets. It is entirely in our interest
to ensure that terrorists cannot operate on Canadian soil and to
share information with U.S. law enforcement agencies.
Laxer concludes, however, that Canada should reject the Fortress
North America concept because it "risks an unacceptable loss of Cana-
dian sovereignty and brings with it no guarantee that the [United States]
131. Id. at 99.
132. Id. at 91.
133. Id. at 105.
134. Id. at 107.
135. JAMES LAXER, THE BORDER: CANADA, THE US AND DISPATCHES FROM THE 4 9TH
PARALLEL 18-19 (Doubleday Canada, 2003).
136. Id. at 248.
137. Id. at 262, 318-19.
138. Id. at 272.
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will ease the security it now plans at the border."139
Donald Barry argues that the erosion of international conditions sus-
taining the approach, the proliferation of issues and actors in Canadian-
U.S. relations, and institutional changes on both sides of the border limit
the application of the Big Idea concept, and that incrementalism, exem-
plified in the Smart Border Declaration, provides a sounder basis for the
management of the relationship. 140 Barry also suggests that "it is highly
unlikely that a grand bargain could be achieved or that it would be in
Canada's interest. As the Conference Board of Canada observes, the
sheer size and complexity of the Canada-U.S. relationship 'would make
one sweeping "grand bargain" extremely difficult to negotiate."' 141 It is
far from certain what actions Ottawa could take to increase border secur-
ity that would cause Washington to forego its own measures. 142 Robert
Wolfe uses similar arguments in recent papers he has written for the
IRPP.1 43
Mel Hurtig, well known for his fear mongering and inaccurate predic-
tions, told the 2003 Couchiching Conference (see below) that, "essen-
tially, the basis for both 'the big idea' and 'the grand bargain' is for
Canada to make a whole package of major concessions to the United
States in order to get greater access to the U.S. market." He also said,
"there's about as much chance of that happening as there is of an anti-
gun, atheist, pro-choice Canadian liberal woman being elected president
of the United States."1 44
Andrew Jackson of the Canadian Labour Congress argued against the
creation of a customs union within a North American security perimeter
as the means to ensure the flow of trade while assuaging U.S. security
concerns. 145 Tony Clark of the Polaris Institute wrote that a North Amer-
ican security perimeter will seriously limit national sovereignty and civil
liberties in Canada. Soon, Canada's policies on immigration, refugees,
and border customs, let alone police powers of search and seizure, will
suddenly be very similar to those of the United States. "A continental
'security perimeter' is not the answer. It would likely unleash new na-
139. Id. at 318-17.
140. Donald Barry, Managing Canada-U.S. Relations in the Post 9/11 Era, Do We Need
a Big Idea?, CSIS Policy Paper on the Americas, Vol. XIV Study 11, Nov. 2003, at
2, available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pp031lbarry%5Bl%5D.pdf.
141. Id. at 17.
142. Id.
143. Robert Wolfe, See you in Washington? A Pluralist Perspective on North American
Institutions, CHOICES, Vol. 9 No. 4, Apr. 2003, available at http://www.irpp.org/fast-
trak/index.htm. Wolfe developed this position further for the IRPP Conference at
Montebello in October 2003, the results of which have not yet been published.
144. Mel Hurtig, The 'Big Idea,' The 'Grand Bargain,' Our Next PM and the Vanishing
Country, Speech to the 72nd Annual Couchiching Conference, Orillia, Ontario,
Aug. 8, 2002, available at http://www.canadiandimension.mb.ca/extra/d0912mh.
htm.
145. Andrew Jackson, Why the 'Big Idea' is a Bad Idea, POLICY OPTIONS, Apr. 2003,
available at http://www.irpp.org.
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tional insecurities with long-term consequences.' 46
ARE CANADA AND MEXICO STILL HOSPITABLE
TO TERRORISTS?
In March 2003, Bill Robson and Danielle Goldfarb of the C.D. Howe
Institute wrote, "[t]he border will only remain open if [U.S.] leaders
know that Canada treats the security of Americans no less seriously than
it treats the security of Canadians. ' 147 In another of the Border Papers
Goldfarb also wrote that Canada needs to develop a long-term security
policy and should do this before discussing any institutional changes with
the United States. Canada also needs seamless cooperation within Ca-
nada. According to Goldfarb, the solution would involve an unprece-
dented level of cooperation and coordination among all three levels of
government and outside agencies: "Canada needs seamless cooperation
and intelligence exchanges among agencies such as CSIS, the RCMP,
CCRA (Customs and Revenue), Immigration, airport and port authori-
ties."'148 In November 2003, Reid Morden, former Director of CSIS,
wrote in a commentary about Canadian intelligence after 9/11 that "Ca-
nada is not 'a Club Med for terrorists,' but there is a very serious job of
rebuilding trust and confidence with the American administration, the
American Congress and American public opinion." 149
In mid-February 2004, the Canadian media cited an October 2003 re-
port by the Federal Research Division of the U.S. Library of Congress,
entitled "Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism." The
report was cited as showing continuing U.S. concerns about lax Canadian
practices. 150 An earlier report by the same body, "Asian Organized
Crime and Terrorist Activity in Canada, 1999 to 2002,"151 concluded that
no amount of funding or staffing could make the Canada-U.S. border
really secure, and therefore "Canadian authorities should emphasize port
security and immigration policy as a means of ensuring that Asian organ-
146. Tony Clark, Developing Common Security through Fair Trade, Polaris Institute,
Oct. 2001, available at http://www.polarisinstitute.org/pubs/pubs-pdfs/betterworld
_possible.pdf.
147. Danielle Goldfarb and William B.P. Robson,, Risky Business: U.S. Border Security
and the Threat to Canadian Exports, CD Howe Institute Commentary No. 177,
Mar. 2003, available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary-177.pdf.
148. Danielle Goldfarb, Thinking the Unthinkable: Security Threats, Cross-Border Im-
plications, and Canada's Long-Term Strategies, The Border Papers, BACK-
GROUNDER No. 77, C.D. Howe Institute, Jan. 2004, available at http://www.
cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_77.pdf.
149. Reid Morden, Spies, Not Soothsayers: Canadian Intelligence After 9/11, Commen-
tary No. 85, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Nov. 26, 2003, available at
http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com85_e.html.
150. Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime & Terrorism, Library of Congress- Federal
Research Division, Oct. 2003, availalbe at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Nats-
Hospitable.pdf.
151. Asian Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Canada, 1999 to 2002, Library of
Congress, Federal Research Division, July 2003, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/
frd/pdf-files/AsianOrgCrimeCanada.pdf.
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ized crime and terrorist groups cannot enter Canada in the first place. '152
The portion of the October 2003 report which dealt with Canada begins
with a quote from a 2001 report of the U.S. State Department: "[o]verall
anti-terrorism cooperation with Canada is excellent, and stands as a
model of how the United States and other nations can work together on
terrorism issues."'153 However, the conclusions of the report with respect
to Canada says that: "[flor terrorist groups, Canada has been a safe ha-
ven, transit point, and place to raise funds; for criminal groups Canada
has provided a route for the trafficking of humans and various illegal
commodities, many of which reach the United States. ' 154 The report also
concludes:
Canada's new legislative initiatives have the potential to reduce the
country's appeal to terrorist organization, international organized
crime groups and alien smugglers, as well as their ability to operate.
However, the economic necessity of expedient movement of persons
and goods across the Canada-U.S. border and Canada's liberal dem-
ocratic identity may continue to limit the adoption of security mea-
sures necessary to completely halt the operations of these groups. 155
Mexico is also dealt with in the same report which starts off by saying
that:
Mexico's suitability as a safe haven for transnational criminal and
terrorist groups is determined by a variety of factors. Those condi-
tions include geographic proximity and ease of access to the United
States; the presence of extra-regional immigrant communities; the
volume and sophistication of domestic commercial activity; the vol-
ume and ease of trans-border movements of goods, persons and
cash; the presence of an established criminal infrastructure; the regu-
latory environment, transparency, and corruptibility of Mexican in-
stitutions; and the capabilities of local law enforcement agencies.
From the specific perspective of terrorist organizations, the most im-
portant factors are opportunities for the clandestine movement of
persons; fundraising and money laundering opportunities; and the
existence, vulnerability, and perceived value of potential targets in
Mexico. 156
The report refers to the interception of two groups of Middle East na-
tionals by U.S. Customs in 2001 and 2002 at the Mexican border. But the
report's conclusions with respect to Mexico do not explicitly mention the
potential for terrorists to enter the United States via Mexico. 157
On March 1, 2004, the front page of the National Post cited an October
2003 CSIS report that: "the world's 'most notorious' terrorist groups con-
tinue to operate in Canada, says a classified intelligence report written
152. Id. at 38.
153. Id. at 144.
154. Id. at 153.
155. Id. at 153-54.
156. Id. at 163.
157. Id. at172.
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two years after Parliament gave police new powers and money to disman-
tle the country's deadly terror networks. ' 158 The National Post article
also noted that:
the CSIS report is similar to a recent U.S. Library of Congress study
that said Canada's welfare system, immigration laws, infrequent
prosecutions and light sentences had turned the country into a
favoured destination for terrorists . . . While the [U.S.] report was
denounced by critics and refugee lobbyists in Canada, the CSIS re-
port comes to many of the same conclusions. It notes that Canada's
"open and tolerant multicultural society, which includes large, identi-
fiable ethno-religious communities from the Middle East, North Af-
rica and South Asia, inter alia, makes this country distinctly
vulnerable to infiltration by international terrorists. 159
On March 12, 2004, the National Post ran an article by Stewart Bell
based on a recent Nixon Center report which described Canada as "a
preferred jihad route to America." The report found that of 212 ter-
rorists examined, twenty-five had used Canada as a base - more than any
other Western country, with the exception of the United States. The re-
port also notes comments by Homeland Security Secretary Ridge that he
was more concerned about the Mexican border than the Canadian border
because "the infrastructure is better on the Canadian side." The report
added:
that other Homeland Security officials offered a different answer
suggesting that Canada was of more concern because of ease of entry
and hospitable surroundings .... The Canadian border is more at-
tractive to Muslims because of the large Canadian Muslim presence,
the support networks created by indulgent asylum and other immi-
gration policies in Canada. 160
The underlying thesis of the Nixon Center report was that:
September 11 served notice how obsolete the Cold War delimitation
of zones of stability (North America and Western Europe) and an
'arc of conflict' (from North Africa to South Asia) had become. The
conflicts of the 'Third World' have come home to roost in a way un-
paralleled in previous periods of colonialism and cold war, of nation-
alism and communism. Western governments now must take into
account the export of violence via migration. Al Qaeda and its affili-
ates depend on immigration to gain entry to the West in order to
carry out terrorist plots. The transnational and asymmetric character
of these new conflicts demands coordination of national and home-
158. Stewart Bell, Canada is Terrorist Haven CSIS: A Place to Hide, Raise Cash, NA-
TIONAL POST, Mar. 1, 2004, at 1.
159. Id.
160. Stewart Bell, Canada's Border A "Jihad Route" Think-Tank Says, NATIONAL
POST, Mar. 12, 2004, at A2. Mr. Bell provided me with an advance copy of the
report, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security After 9/11, by
Robert Leiken, available at http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/
LeikenBearers ofGlobalJihad.pdf.
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land security with immigration and foreign policies. 16 1
The cover of the March 15, 2004, Canadian edition of Time magazine is
entitled "Canada's Blind Eye to Terror," and the issue features an article
based on a new book by Stewart Bell, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures
and Exports Terrorism Around the World.162 Bell claims that "during the
past two decades Canada has become the best country in the world for
terrorists to make their home." Bell also claims that by failing to take
action early on, Canada opened the door to the world's major security
threat, al-Qaeda. He says that extremists have seized control of Cana-
dian refugee communities, that Canadian based terror creates risks for
Canadians who travel, and that Canada's approach to counter-terrorism
undermines Canadian foreign policy. 163 The Time article highlights the
1998 testimony by Ward Elcock, Director of the Canadian Security Intel-
ligence Service (CSIS) that "with perhaps the single exception of the
United States, there are more international terrorist groups active here
than in any other country."' 64
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CANADA'S REFUGEE POLICY
The key issue with respect to Canadian security policies and practices
as they related to terrorism is the American perception that the adminis-
tration of Canada's refugee policy is done in a very lax manner. This
poses a threat not just to Canada, but to the United States since it allows
the possibility of entry into the United States from Canada as demon-
strated in the Ressam case. Several Canadians have written extensively
and critically about the administration of the refugee policy and the po-
tential threat that it poses to the security of Canada and to the United
States. Most well-known is James Bissett, former Executive Director of
the Canadian Immigration Service, who is extremely critical of the ad-
ministration of Canada's refugee policy, which he believes represents the
"weakest link":
In November 2001, two months after the terrorist attacks, the Cana-
dian Parliament passed new legislation that makes it easier for asy-
lum seekers to apply for refugee status and makes it more difficult
for those found not to be genuine refugees to be sent home. Conse-
quently, the security of both countries remains vulnerable to a Cana-
dian asylum system that seems designed to openly welcome potential
terrorists. 165
161. Robert Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security After
9/11, at vi.
162. Stewart Bell, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around
the World, John Wiley & Sons Canada Ltd., Mar. 2004.
163. Blind to Terror, TIME, Canadian edition, Mar.15, 2004, at 43-47.
164. Id. at 43-47.
165. James Bissett, Canada's Asylum Policy: A Threat to American Security?. Back-
ground Paper for the Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, D.C., May
2002, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back402.html.
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More recently, in a paper which he presented to the Trilateral Commis-
sion, Bissett wrote:
there are a number of Canadian policy issues that are at the root of
American concerns about Canada's approach to security issues fol-
lowing 9/11. One is the refusal or hesitancy of the Canadian Govern-
ment to list as terrorist organizations groups that their own security
agency has recommended to be so listed. Secondly, if Canada is to
restore the confidence of the United States in the war against terror-
ism it will have to reform its overly generous asylum system. Ca-
nada's inability to keep track of individuals who have been ordered
deported and our ineffective removal policies are also of concern to
the Americans. None of these policy problem areas has major or
serious implications. Most of them can be changed without legisla-
tion. The asylum problem may require adjustments to the Immigra-
tion Act but the others are primarily a matter of a change in attitude,
a shifting of priorities, and possibly additional funding for the track-
ing and removal of illegal entrants. The question is whether there is
the political will to do them. The consequences of not doing them
will mean continued trouble along the border. 166
Other Canadians who have written critically on this issue include Mar-
tin Collacott, a former Canadian diplomat who is a Fellow at the Fraser
Institute. In 2000 Collacott told the U.S. House of Representatives Com-
mittee on the Judiciary that
a major obstacle in the way of instituting fundamental reforms is the
existence of a highly articulate and influential lobby, comprised in
large part of refugee lawyers and advocacy groups whose funding is
closely related to the continued arrival and settlement of significant
numbers of refugee claimants in Canada. A similar situation exists
in the United States. 167
In March 2003 Collacott wrote in the Fraser Forum:
we are doing little to assure the Americans that we are dealing ade-
quately with the issue of terrorism in Canada, particularly when it
comes to exercising effective control over whom we allow into Ca-
nada through the refugee determination system. Rather than deal-
ing with the roots of the problem, our government has tried to avoid
the issue by arguing that Canada has unjustly been accused of being
soft on terrorism, and that a good public relations campaign is what
is required to correct this situation.168
166. James Bissett, Troubled Borders, Canada, the United States and Mexico, Paper Pre-
pared for the Trilateral Commission, Nov. 2003 (provided to the author by James
Bissett and quoted with his permission).
167. Martin Collacott, written statement to the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary of the US House of Representatives,
Jan.25, 2000, available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/col10125.htm. See also
Martin Collacott, Terrorism, Refugees and Homeland Security, 2002 Distinguished
Speakers Series in Political Geography, Royal Military College of Canada.
168. Martin Collacott, Canada's Inadequate Border Controls, Fraser Forum, Mar. 2003,
at 14, available at http://www.fraserinstitute.org/admin/books/chapterfiles/Canadas
%201nadequate%20Border%20Controls-ppl2-14.pdf#.
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In May 2003, Collacott addressed the Center for Immigration Studies
in Washington, D.C., where he criticized Canada's lax asylum policies and
particularly their connection with the ease with which terrorists enter Ca-
nada and are able to remain in Canada. 169 Collacott said it was his view
that, in recent decades, Canada's immigration and refugee policies have
been driven largely by pressure from special interest groups, as well as by
perceived political gains on the party in power-particularly when it
comes to immigration policy, less so with refugee policy. And the govern-
ment, therefore, does not want to see its policies in these areas affected
by the events of September l1th if it can be avoided. What happened
after September 11th was that Canada did its best to demonstrate that it
was fully engaged in the fight against terrorism in terms of pledging
troops in Afghanistan and strengthening anti-terrorism legislation before
Parliament. Immigration and refugee legislation on the other hand, were
described as "reflecting Canadian values and principles," and hopefully
would be immune from changes which might have to be made in response
to 9/11."170
Collacott also noted:
those of us like myself who think we need major reforms in fact take
the view that most of the things we should be doing, which would be
satisfying to the American government on this issue, we should be
doing anyway for our own welfare and for our own protection. And
in fact one of the ironies is that by not controlling our border we're
eroding our sovereignty to some extent, because one of the charac-
teristics of a sovereign independent state is you've got control over
your border. Right now virtually anyone who wants to enter Canada
can do so by just saying they're a refugee claimant. If we tighten up
on this system we not only reassert our sovereignty by giving better
protection to our border but we also have the rather important spin-
off that we satisfy the United States for some extent. 171
Fred McMahon of the Fraser Institute has also criticized Canada's refu-
gee policies: "Canada's border controls are a mess. Illegitimate refu-
gees-or terrorists-can destroy their identification papers on a flight to
Canada, arrive at customs without papers, claim refugee status, and be
out on the streets a few hours later."'1 72
Daniel Stoffman, in his June 2002 book Who Gets In: What's Wrong
with Canada's Immigration Program and How to Fix It, takes aim at ele-
ments of both the immigration program and the refugee program. 173
Stoffman quotes many former senior Canadian mandarins who believe
169. Center for Immigration Studies, U.S-Canada Border Issues,Panel Discussion Tran-




172. Fred McMahon, Perimeter Puzzle, Fraser Institute, Dec. 2001, available at http://
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the current system is in "shambles:" Tom Kent ("Canada's reputation of
competent government is badly tarnished"); William Bauer, former Am-
bassador and IRB member (calls the current Canadian refugee system
"massive corruption of the noble concept of political asylum"); and Jack
Manion, former Deputy Minister of Immigration ("a shocking and scan-
dalous mess"). 174 Stoffman says the refugee determination system cannot
distinguish between real refugees and fraudulent ones. There is no need,
however, to make the Canadian system identical to the American one,
which is far from perfect. "We need to rebuild our system in a manner
which serves the collective interests of all Canadians, which will also re-
store the confidence of the Americans. '175
Stoffman says the major problem with the Immigration and Refugee
Board (IRB) is that it allows people to circumvent the regular immigra-
tion program by awarding Geneva Convention refugee status to
thousands of people who have no chance of obtaining it elsewhere. The
IRB is staffed by "amateurs" and should be replaced by professional pub-
lic servants. 176 Stoffman says that Canada's asylum system is an invita-
tion to terrorists and criminals because Canada neither excludes nor
detains undocumented arrivals and refugee claimants are not detained
even if the IRB rules them inadmissible. 77 Stoffman quotes the 1998
testimony of Ward Elcock, Director of CSIS, mentioned above that
"there are more international terrorist groups active in Canada than in
any other country in the world, except the United States." Elcock identi-
fied transit of terrorists to and from the United States as an important
activity of terrorist organizations in Canada in that same statement.
Stoffman also quotes Mark Krikorian, Executive Director of the
Center for Immigration Studies in Washington: "terrorists from all over
the world have been using Canada's asylum system. You can come in to
Canada with no documents or fake documents and say you want asylum
and they let you in."' 178 Stoffman examines some of the issues related to
a security perimeter around the United States and Canada and says there
are two main problems: (1) the Canadian immigration and refugee sys-
tems are in such disarray that American security would be compromised
if border controls were removed; and (2) the U.S. system was also in a
mess, and Canadian security would be at risk if Canada stopped checking
people entering from the south. 179 He notes with irony that notwith-
standing the fact that far more people cross illegally into the United
States from Mexico, and that millions who have entered the United
States legally as visitors or students have stayed on illegally, it is Canada's
"inept system" for dealing with refugees claimants that has captured the
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id. at 5, 7.
176. Id. at 12-13.
177. Id. at 22.
178. Id. at 59.
179. Id. at 48.
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attention of the United States.180
Stoffman suggests that the real reason why the Chr6tien government
did not like the North American security perimeter was that "it
threatened their ability to run the immigration program for political
gain. ' 18 1 He notes, "there is no possibility the United States will remove
barriers to entry at its borders with Canada if this means leaving Ameri-
can citizens at the mercy of criminals and undesirables unleashed on Ca-
nadian society by the IRB. '' 18 2 Stoffman believes that even with the 1985
Supreme Court decision that all refugee claimants have the right to an
oral hearing, the government could reduce the numbers of false refugee
claimants by establishing a competent tribunal, detaining undocumented
arrivals, reducing the layers of appeals, and swiftly deporting failed
claimants. 18 3
Stephen Gallagher is another critic of Canada's refugee determination
policy. In Canada's Dysfunctional Refugee Determination System: Cana-
dian Asylum Policy from a Comparative Perspective, Gallagher makes
many of the points made by Bissett, Collacott, and Stoffman, and con-
cludes that:
the gulf between Canadian policy and practice, on the one hand, and
international norms, on the other, is now so stark that control of ille-
gal immigration cannot be seen as a priority of the Canadian govern-
ment. In fact, if interdiction policies were set aside, the range of in-
country policies examined here act more to attract than deter illegal
immigration. Canada's reception conditions for illegally arriving asy-
lum seekers is little different from that faced by legally arriving im-
migrants. The first-instance refugee determination and appeal
processes are the most liberal in the world and routinely recognize as
Convention Refugees more than half of those claimants that com-
plete the process. Furthermore, there are numerous post-determina-
tion features to the system, including its removal policies that work
to the advantage of those who would not have the slightest possibil-
ity of being recognized as Convention Refugees in any other country.
Finally, Permanent Residence Status and citizenship come relatively
smoothly and quickly to most and does not appear unattainable to
many. Taken together, these policies provide an alternate and fairly
reliable means of immigrating to Canada from a range of countries in
the developing world. Although clearly not the intent of the policy,
much of Canada's asylum system approximates a self-selected hu-
manitarian immigration program. 184
180. Id.
181. Id. at 49.
182. Id. at 53.
183. Id. at 74-75, 171-72.
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In March 2003, I testified before the Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, which was holding hearings on Canadian
foreign policy, as an input into the foreign policy consultation which For-
eign Minister Graham was having with Canadians without involving the
Standing Committee. I noted that the U.S. Ambassador to Canada had
stated recently that U.S. security concerns trump Canadian economic
concerns. The challenge for Canadian policy makers was how to find a
way to mesh these two objectives in a manner which both sides find ac-
ceptable. My testimony focused on two areas, one of which was whether
we should seek a North American security perimeter or do we want the
Canada-U.S. border to be the point where U.S. security concerns have to
be satisfied. I noted the problems with our refugee determination system,
welcomed the fact that Canada had negotiated a safe third country agree-
ment with the United States, and suggested that refugee claimants arriv-
ing from Europe should be sent back there since they were certainly safe
third countries.
I made clear that I was not advocating a reduction in the number of
legitimate refugees that Canada takes in. However, we needed some fun-
damental adjustments to the administration of that policy, in our own
interests and to satisfy American security concerns. It makes no sense to
go to Windsor and proclaim the weaknesses in the American system to
justify the weaknesses in the Canadian system. Canada does not need to
adopt the American system, but it does need a system that can convince
Americans that it is just as secure as their own. We do not have it now
and until we do, this will be a major impediment to reducing the uncer-
tainties of the bilateral border.185
There was absolutely no reaction from any of the MPs present to that
part of the presentation, which I do not interpret as agreement, but rather
as a reluctance or fear to even broach the subject. A revised version of
my testimony appeared in the May 2003 issue of Policy Options, "Ca-
nada-U.S. Relations in the Post-Iraq-War Era: Stop the Drift Towards
Irrelevance." One of the revisions was to suggest that while most Canadi-
ans are adamantly opposed to a two-tier Medicare system, they seem ob-
livious to the two-tier immigration system that exists because of
procedures adopted to administer Canadian refugee policy that permits
queue jumping over the regular immigration process. 186
It is interesting to note that the CD Howe Border Paper, "U.S. and
Canadian Immigration Policies: Marching Together to Different Tunes,"
did itemize problems with Canada's refugee determination system and
U.S. criticism of it, but it suggested that entry as a visitor would offer a
terrorist the path of least resistance. The paper notes that "the modus
185. John J. Noble, Statement to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Inter-
national Trade on Canada's Foreign Policy Objectives, Mar. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/papers/scfaitnoble.doc.
186. John J. Noble, Canada-U.S. Relations in the Post-Iraq-War Era: Stop the Drift To-
wards Irrelevance, POLICY OPIriONS, May 2003, at 21, available at http://www.irpp.
org/po/index.htm.
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operandi of the 9/11 terrorists suggest that they understood that the
weakest link in North American border security lay in the admission and
monitoring of tourists, international students, business people and other
temporary entrants," because there are no exit controls and no way of
knowing whether those who were admitted temporarily ever leave. 187
DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE BORDER
In April 2003, Glynn Custred published a paper for the Center for Im-
migration Studies entitled "North American Borders: Why They Matter,"
in which he quotes Roger Gibbons' statement that the Canada-U.S. bor-
der "'penetrates the Canadian consciousness, identity, economy, and pol-
ity to a degree unknown and unimaginable in the United States."'
Because 80 percent of Canadians live within 150 kilometres of the border,
Gibbons says, Canada is a "borderland society" in contrast to the United
States, where the northern border plays almost no role at all in forming
the national consciousness. 188
Custred notes:
to many Americans, the longest undefended border in the world now
looks like a 4000 mile-long portal for terrorists due, in part, to differ-
ent political cultures making the kind of 'harmonization' of policies
necessary for a North American security zone impossible. Although
no terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks entered via Ca-
nada, terrorists in the past, like Ahmed Ressam, have taken advan-
tage of lax border security. 189
He goes on to conclude that:
what the United States sees today when it looks at its northern flank
is a neighbour that disregards document fraud, maintains lax visa
practices, and has the most generous asylum policy in the world. Few
asylum seekers are rejected, violators of immigration laws are not
vigorously pursued, no one is tracked once inside the country, terror-
ist groups have the freedom to raise money, criminal enterprises
(people smugglers) are establishing a secure territorial base and end-
less litigation negates the law and favours criminals. There is little
prospect of changing any of this in a serious way, for as Canadians
bluntly tell Americans, decisions of that kind are made in Ottawa not
Washington. 190
187. Peter Rekai, US and Canadian Immigration Policies: Marching Together to Differ-
ent Tunes, The Border Papers, CD How Institute Commentary, No. 171, Nov. 2002,
at 15, available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/Rekai.pdf.
188. Glynn Custred North American Borders: Why They Matter, Center for Immigra-
tion Studies, Apr. 2003 at 2, available at http://www.cis.org/artices/2003/back803.
html.
189. Id. at 3.
190. Id. at 4.
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MORE BORDER COOPERATION REQUIRED: DELAY IN
IMPLEMENTING SAFE THIRD
One of the problems in the Canadian refugee process relates to the fact
that between one-third and one-half of those who make refugee claims in
Canada have a valid visa for travel to the United States in their passport.
Thousands of Costa Ricans and Mexicans with valid visas for travel to the
United States have then made refugee claims in Canada. Presumably
they would not have been issued visas by U.S. officials if their true mo-
tives had been known. 191
Another problem for Canada in stemming the flow of refugee claim-
ants arriving across the U.S. border, which former Deputy Prime Minister
John Manley said amounted to 70 percent of those making refugee claims
in Canada, is the U.S. delay in bringing into force the safe third country
agreement negotiated between the two countries in 2002.192 This agree-
ment would mean that people crossing the Canada-U.S. land border and
claiming refugee/asylum status in the other country would be sent back to
the country from which they exited to have their claim adjudicated. This
agreement is far more important to Canada than to the United States,
since the number of people entering the United States from Canada and
claiming asylum is very small, while the flow in the other direction is
considerable.
To date, Canada has pre-published its draft implementing regulations
in October 2002 and responded to a parliamentary committee report in
March 2003. The Canadian side is ready to move forward to finalize the
regulations as soon as it knows how the United States plans to regulate.
The United States published its draft regulations on March 8, 2004.
There will now be a sixty-day public comment period following this which
could result in revisions to the regulations before they are finally ap-
proved and the agreement implemented.1 93
The Martin government's mention in the Speech from the Throne of
engaging with the United States to further strengthen North American
security beyond the Smart Border Plan and to reform the refugee deter-
mination process to create a more predictable and streamlined system,
including a reformed appointment process to ensure the quality and ef-
191. According to a senior public servant in the Canadian government.
192. Canadian statistics can be confusing. Refugee claims can be made either on arrival
at a port of entry (air, land, or land border), or inland. In 2003 there were 32,000
claims. In 2001 the figure was 43,000. For most of the 1990s the average was
25,000. Every year for the past decade between 30 and 35% of total refugee claims
were made by persons arriving directly at land border ports of entry (i.e., from the
United States). In 2003, 60% of claims were made inland. It is impossible to know
for certain how inland claimants came to Canada since most destroy their docu-
ments. Once biometrics are included in passports and visas and the information
sharing system with the United States is fully operational, there will be a much
better idea of how many inland claimants come from the United States.
193. Marina Jimenez, New Rule About to Come Into Effect That Could Reduce Refugee
Claims, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 9, 2004, at A4, available at http://globeand
mail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/TPStory/LAC/20040309/BORDER09/.
FORTRESS AMERICA
fectiveness of the Immigration and Refugee Board, appears to reply to
some of the many criticisms and perceptions about Canada's lax refugee
determination process, made by Canadians and Americans.
THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER
The problem of illegal migration from Mexico is a multifaceted peren-
nial problem that worries many Americans. In November 2000, Harvard
professor Samuel Huntington wrote that, "Mexican immigration poses
challenges to our policies and to our identity in a way nothing else has in
the past. 1 94 Huntington concluded that Mexican immigration was a
"unique, disturbing, and looming challenge to our cultural integrity, our
national identity, and potentially to our future as a country. '195
A year later Steven Camarota produced another report entitled "Immi-
gration from Mexico: Assessing the Impact on the United States." His
main findings include: (1) Mexican immigration has added significantly to
the size of the poor and uninsured populations, as well as to the welfare
case load in the United States; and (2) the heavy concentration of Mexi-
can immigrants at the bottom of the labour market is also likely to have a
significant negative effect on the wages of the more than ten million un-
skilled natives who are in direct competition with unskilled immi-
grants.196 Camarota noted, "[w]hereas the Mexican government has
made clear its desire that more immigrants be allowed to come north, the
available data suggest that the costs to the United States clearly outweigh
the benefits. '197
Glynn Custred notes:
the level of trust and cooperation between American and Mexican
authorities is quite different from that encountered on the [U.S.]-
Canadian border. This disjunction is partly a reflection of the differ-
ence in institutional effectiveness on either side of the line and partly
a result of Mexican national identity defined by opposition to the
United States.
Custred also says that the U.S.-Mexico border is not only a boundary
between two nations; it marks the zone where two culture areas of the
Western Hemisphere meet, and the divide between the prosperity of the
developed world and the relative poverty of the Third World.198
Whereas Americans give little thought to the Canadian border, the
Mexican border looms much larger in the collective American mind,
194. Samuel P. Huntington, Reconsidering Immigration: Is Mexico a Special Case,
Center for Immigration Studies, Nov. 2000, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/
2000/back1100.html.
195. Id. at 7.
196. Steven A. Camarota, Immigration from Mexico: Assessing the Impact on the United
States, The Center for Immigration Studies, July 2001, at 10, available at http://
www.cis.org/articles/2001/mexico/mexico.pdf.
197. Id. at 60.
198. Glynn Custred, North American Borders: Why They Matter, Center for Immigra-
tion Studies, Apr. 2003, at 5.
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for it is connected with the vision of the frontier that plays such an
important role in the self-definition of the American nation. 199
Just as Canadians and American imagine their common border in
different ways, so too is there a difference between the way Mexicans
and Americans view the boundary that separates their two countries.
Americans overwhelmingly imagine their national community and its
territorial integrity as defined by a strictly delineated boundary be-
tween their country and Mexico. 200
In her March 4, 2004, testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Government reforms, Jessica Vaughan of the Center for
Immigration Studies noted, "the land border entry system, especially the
southern border, is a loose sieve that is exploited by all kinds of illegal
aliens, including terrorists." She also mentioned that that Mexicans re-
present the largest number of illegal aliens in the country (about 70 per-
cent) and mentioned, "terrorists, such as Lebanese Hezbollah operative
Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, indicted last year in Detroit, have been
smuggled in from Mexico in the past, perhaps with the support of Mexi-
can diplomats, such as the consul fired from her post in Lebanon last
year. "201
James Bissett offers a Canadian perspective on the Mexico-U.S.
border:
The southern border of the United States with Mexico presents a
much different problem for the Americans than does its northern
border with Canada. The issue with Mexico has less to do with 9/11
than it does with the long standing problem of the thousands of ille-
gal Mexicans who cross the border illegally as "wet backs" searching
for work and a higher standard of living in the USA. Related to this
problem has been the pre-9/11 tendency for politicians in the United
States to close their eyes to this illegal movement. Nothing demon-
strates the ambivalence of [U.S.] policy towards enforcement of im-
migration laws, as does the issue of illegal immigration from
Mexico. 202
Bissett also says that Mexico's attitude toward their northern border
contrasts sharply with their own policy on the southern border with Gua-
temala. There the border is militarized and every means is used to pre-
vent illegal entrants into Mexico. Some Mexican officials have admitted
that they do not want Central Americans competing with their own peo-
ple in entering the United States illegally.
199. Id. at 9
200. Id.
201. Jessica M Vaughan, America's New Welcome Mat: A Look at the Goals and Chal-
lenges of the US-VISIT Program, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representa-
tives Committee on Government Reform, Mar. 4, 2004, available at http://www.cis.
org/articles/2004/jessicatestimony030404.html.
202. James Bissett, Troubled Borders, Canada, the United States and Mexico.
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ADMINISTRATION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
ASYLUM POLICIES
The United States does not have a much better record on the adminis-
tration of its asylum (refugee) policy either before or after 9/11. In De-
cember 2003, the Center for Immigration Studies in Washington, D.C.
issued a report, "Falling Behind on Security: Implementation of the En-
hanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002," which is
both complimentary, but mainly highly critical of many shortfalls in im-
plementing the Act. It concludes that "as we approach the second anni-
versary of the law's enactment, the Bush Administration is falling behind
and has not carried out several of the legislation's key provisions. As a
result, many of the loopholes that were exploited by the 9/11 terrorists
are still open, leaving us vulnerable to future attacks. '20 3 The Center for
Immigration Studies has previously published a major report of the many
weaknesses in the American system entitled "The Open Door: How Mili-
tant Islamic Terrorists Entered and remained in the United States, 1993-
2001. ' ' 204 That study found that the forty-eight terrorists studied had
manipulated almost every possible means of admission to the United
States: some had indeed come as students, tourists, and business trav-
elers; others, however, had been Lawful Permanent Residents and natu-
ralized U.S. citizens; while yet others had snuck across the border, arrived
as stowaways on ships, used false passports, been granted amnesty, or
been applicants for asylum.
James Bissett also criticized the administration of American policies as
well as Canadian refugee policies:
In the United States before the September 11 attack there were
314,000 illegal aliens who had been ordered deported but who re-
mained at large. Some 78,000 of these were people from terrorist
producing countries. In Canada, the Auditor General reported that
36,000 arrest warrants for individuals in Canada who had evaded the
removal process had not been acted upon. In both countries viola-
tion of immigration laws was common and of little consequence.2 0 5
Bissett also points out that "all of the 19 terrorists involved in the 9/11
attacks entered the United States on temporary visas and some of them
203. Falling Behind on Security: Implementation of the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Center for Immigration Studies, Dec. 2003, availa-
ble at http://www.cis.org/articIes/2003/back1903.html.
204. Steven A. Camarota, The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and
Remained in the United States, 1993-2001, Center for Immigration Studies, Papers
No. 21, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/terrorpr.html.
205. James Bissett, Troubled Borders, Canada, the United States and Mexico. The most
recent figures used by an American are that there are some 400,000 aliens living in
the United States who have been ordered deported, and that 80,000 of them have
serious criminal records. See Michael W. Cutler, Funding for Immigration in the
President's 2005 Budget, Testimony Before the House Judiciary Committee Sub-
committee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Mar. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/cutlertestimony031104.html.
2005]
510 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 11
received their visa without being seen by an American official. '20 6
Michael W. Cutler, Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies, testi-
fied on March 11, 2004, that "half of the aliens in the United States did
not succeed in entering the United States by running the border but
rather entered through a port of entry and then, in one way or another,
violated the terms of their admission. '207
Daniel Stoffman notes, "the major reason Canada should fear the
United States is that the States is home to the greatest collection of un-
identified illegal immigrants anywhere in the world. '20 8 He points out
that bad guys are as likely to get into the United States from Mexico as
from Canada, and that an increasing number of people arrested coming
over the Mexican border are what U.S. Border Patrol agents call
"OTMs," or "other than Mexicans. '209 Stoffman notes, "Americans, for
all their recent talk about the need for secure borders, are ambivalent
about the subject." The American agriculture industry and many Ameri-
can families employ the cheap labour that illegal immigration provides.
He also notes problems with the U.S. system for keeping track of people
ordered deported; at the time the United States could not account for
300,000 such persons, while the figure in Canada was 28,000. (The Cana-
dian figure has since risen with the Auditor General saying it was at 36,
000 last year, while the U.S. figure has reached over 400,000). Stoffman
also points out that several of the 9/11 hijackers had driver's licenses is-
sued in Virginia, a service which was hastily ended on September 21,
2001.210
COMPARING THE CANADIAN AND U.S. SYSTEMS OF
REFUGEE/ASYLUM DETERMINATION
In comparing the two systems, the first thing to note is that Canadian
officials claim they produce outcomes with similar results: Canada has a
41 percent acceptance rate; the United States a 37 percent acceptance
rate. Stephen Gallagher points out that the UNHCR statistics are quite
different, with Canada having an acceptance rate of 57.8 percent and the
United States having a 34.9 percent acceptance rate. A former American
Immigration official at the April 1-2 Conference pointed out that the U.S.
rate is much higher: when the stage two acceptances are included, it is
about 60 percent. In both countries an asylum claim trumps the normal
entry requirements. The United States has put in place expedited re-
moval, which takes undocumented arrivals out of the regular process.
But the expedited removal process in the United States actually stops less
206. James Bissett, Troubled Borders, Canada, the United States and Mexico.
207. Michael W. Cutler, Funding for Immigration in the President's 2005 Budget, Testi-
mony Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration, Bor-
der Security and Claims, Mar. 11, 2004, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/
2004/cutlertestimony03ll04.html.
208. Daniel Stoffman, supra note 163, at 66.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 71.
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than one in ten of those undocumented arrivals out of the U.S. asylum
system.
Where the two counties differ in a substantive way is in terms of law
enforcement prosecutions and detention. The United States uses deten-
tion much more aggressively than Canada. Until recently that basically
meant a willingness to spend more money (a lot more money), but since
9/11, there has also been a backing away from legal protections that still
hold sway in Canada. Similarly, there is greater willingness to prosecute,
a greater ability to convict, and harsher penalties imposed by the courts in
the case of smugglers and traffickers than in Canada.
But does this mean that the U.S. system is better than the Canadian
system in terms of entry control and removals? In terms of entry, if one
looks at the number of asylum seekers coming to Canada via the United
States, they do not appear to have had difficulty getting past U.S. entry
controls. In terms of removals, Canadian officials maintain that except in
a limited number of high profile security cases, again, the answer is no.
They also suggest that if they did not have to deal with ten to fifteen
thousand extra refugee claimants a year coming from the United States
they would have considerably more resources to apply to enforcement,
detention, and removals. That is why the safe third country agreement
mentioned above is so important to Canada: it will both relieve some of
the present burden and force to the United States take some responsibil-
ity for the present flows of refugee claimants into Canada.
THE TRILATERAL MIRAGE: THE TALE OF TWO
NORTH AMERICAS
In May 2003 Jean Daudelin, Professor at Carleton University wrote:
Canada's eggs are in the Northern-North American basket and this
is the basket whose governance we should be preoccupied with.
Border management, migration, security, standards as well as cur-
rency are just too consequential to be tackled in a framework that
brings to bear Mexico's own problems and preoccupations, as well as
the complexities and scope of its bilateral relationship with the
United States.
For Canada, the trilateral option should not be pursued beyond
existing arrangements, essentially around NAFTA, except in an ad-
hoc manner and avoiding any significant institution-building. Ca-
nada's bilateral relationship with the United States is vital and its
management should not be cluttered by the massive complexity of
Mexico-U.S. affairs.2 11
Daudelin was categorical "there is simply no sound rationale for tri-
lateralism in North-America." He noted that:
211. Jean Daudelin, The Trilateral Mirage: A Tale of Two North Americas, Canadian
Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, May 2003, available at http://www.cdfai.org/
PDFrThe%20Trilateral %2OMirage.pdf.
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the inability of NAFTA to produce greater trilateral interdepen-
dence is in fact recognized by the advocates of trilateralism them-
selves, such as Robert Pastor (2001) and Andres Rozental (2002), for
instance, who call for the establishment of institutions not mainly to
manage an already existing and problematic trilateral reality, but
above all to further build and consolidate such a reality. 212
Daudelin also pointed out:
a striking illustration of the irrelevance of trilateralism was recently
provided by Jorge Castafieda who, until recently, was Vicente Fox's
Minister of Foreign Affairs and, at least in that function, a vocal pro-
ponent of North-American integration. In a piece just published by
Foreign Affairs [Castafieda-2003] where he examines the U.S. rela-
tionship with 'the hemisphere,' Castafieda touches on immigration,
Summits, free trade and the 'North-American Community,' and yet,
the word Canada does not appear once in his article. As a neat in-
stance of Canada-Mexico reciprocity, it is thus only fitting that in an
article specifically devoted to 'North American Integration' from a
Canadian viewpoint, Drew Fagan [2003] also forgets to mention
Mexico at all. And in truth, both are dead right: Mexico's North-
America does not include Canada, nor does Canada's North-
America include Mexico. 213
(President Fox made several references to the need for cooperation
with Canada in North America in his March 6, 2004, joint press confer-
ence with President Bush, when he talked about the "North American
Initiative"). 214
THE 2003 COUCHICHING CONFERENCE: CONTINENTALISM
In the summer of 2003, the annual Couchiching Conference considered
the issue "Continentalism: What's In It for Us," noting that it was taking
place at a time of heightened concern over border issues and national
security. 215 Stephen Handleman made the point that Y2K established in
people's minds that there was a "North American space" that needed
protection due to its technological advancement, and this concept has
been reinforced over the years. Handleman supported the idea of a
"Zone of Confidence" or "Continental Security Area" and illustrated
how attacks on the United States are linked as attacks on Canada and
Mexico due to the interconnected nature of our North American infra-
structure.216 He also suggested that while Deputy Prime Minister John
212. Id. at 8.
213* Id. at 9.
214. The White House, Press Release, President Bush, Mexican President Fox Recon-
firm Commitment to Security, Mar. 6, 2004, Crawford, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040306-3.html.
215. Continentalism: What's In It for Us?, The Couchiching Institute of Public Affairs,
Summer Conference 2003, available at http://www.couch.ca/history/index.html.
216. From Norad to Northcom: Who Takes Orders from Whom?, The Couchiching In-
stitute of Public Affairs, Summer Conference 2003, available at http://www.couch.
ca/history/2003/NoradSummary.html.
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Manley shied away from the "P-word" (as in "perimeter"), the long dis-
cussed American concept of "homeland defence" had clearly been subtly
enlarged to include the perimeters of the continent.21 7
Michael Wilson said that trade policy must be seen in the context of
increased national security concerns. It was in Canada's interest to work
with the United States on a number of issues, not just trade. Security
institutions, including NATO, NORAD, and the G7 link between Canada
and the United States, differentiate it from U.S.-Mexico bilateral rela-
tions. As the United States is more driven by security issues, Canada
must engage it in broader security dialogue. 218 Maria de Lourdes Dieck-
Assad, Under Secretary for International Economic Relations and Inter-
national Cooperation in the Mexican Foreign Ministry, noted that Ca-
nada and Mexico have many similarities, sharing large borders with the
United States and needing to ensure some form of smart border, and they
should find ways to take advantage of their complimentarity. 21 9
Renee St. Jacques, Chief Economist and Director General of Micro
Economic Policy Analysis at Industry Canada, told the conference, "eco-
nomic integration does not necessarily mean any loss in sovereignty nor
in the ability of Canada to pursue separate and more generous social or
labour programs. '220
The Governor of the Bank of Canada, David Dodge, who kicked off
the Couchiching Conference with reflections on economic integration in
North America noted, "as we in Canada consider deeper economic inte-
gration, we also have to consider what measures we would take to actu-
ally build a common security perimeter around North America. 221
Canadian Foreign Minister-Bill Graham gave the closing speech at the
Couchiching Conference and was somewhat more candid about North
American integration than many of his Cabinet colleagues. He admitted
that those responsible for Canadian public policy have been wrestling
with the question:
how can we best enjoy the benefits of an economic and security part-
nership with the United States. (and now Mexico) while retaining
our capacity to pursue distinctively Canadian policies within our bor-
ders as well as differing relations with the wider world? It is impor-
tant to start with the observation that the benefits we stand to gain
217. Stephen Handleman, Whose Border Is it Anyway?, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL,
Summer 2003, at 457.
218. Is There a NAFTA Plus?, Couchiching Institute of Public Affairs, Summer Confer-
ence of 2003, available at http://www.couch.ca/2003/NaftaPIusSummary.html. Full
text available as Whose Border is it Anyway?, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Summer
2003, at 455-64.
219. Id.
220. Rende St-Jacques, Sovereignty or Standard of Living: Is There a Trade-Off?,
Couchiching Conference, Aug. 2003, available at http://www.couch.ca/history/in-
dex.html.
221. Economic Integration in North America, The Couchiching Institute of Public Af-
fairs, Summer Conference 2003, available at http://www.couch.calhistory/2003/
DodgeSummary.html. Full text in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Summer 2003, at
419-32.
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by integration do serve national priorities of the first order, namely
economic prosperity and the security of our country and
continent.222
In summarizing the conclusions of the conference, David McGowan,
President of the Couchiching Institute on Public Affairs, made the follow-
ing points: (1) no North American project, "grand bargain" or "big idea"
is likely any time soon-from either a political or economic perspective;
(2) closer economic integration cannot move forward without recognizing
the importance of border security to the United States; (3) there is a
range of potential sector agreements that could be delivered, either bilat-
erally or trilaterally, that would not raise sovereignty concerns in Canada
and Mexico and would likely fly under the political radar screen of Wash-
ington; and (4) closer integration will lead to greater harmonization of
the regulatory infrastructure in ways that will bring greater economic ad-
vantages to each of the North American partners.223
THE PUBLIC POLICY FORUM'S "RETHINKING NORTH
AMERICAN INTEGRATION" CONFERENCE
At the end of October 2003, the Public Policy Forum held its "Rethink-
ing North American Integration" Conference in Ottawa. A clear consen-
sus emerged on several important themes throughout the two-day event
which reflects an optimistic and realistic view of the future of North
American integration. First, economic integration is a reality, with busi-
nesses as the key actors. While national governments have numerous
contacts, sub-national actors-provinces/states and municipalities-are
increasingly creating linkages. Second, deepening economic integration
is possible while maintaining national political, social, and cultural auton-
omy. Third, environmental issues emerged as an area where consensus
on the need for more cooperation and harmonization exists. Fourth,
NAFTA is working. As a result, the most realistic and beneficial progress
will come through deepening and broadening its framework through in-
cremental steps, rather than "big bang" change. And finally, Canada and
Mexico share important interests and branding problems vis-A-vis the
United States, and should therefore work on strengthening their relation-
ship. 224 One of the panellists, Deborah Meyers of the Migration Policy
Institute, who has done an analysis of the two Smart Border accords, said
there was need for a more secure continental perimeter.225 She noted,
222. Sovereignty, Interdependence and Integration, Notes for an Address by the Hon.
Bill Graham at the 72nd Annual Summer Conference of the Couchiching Institute
of Public Affairs, at 2, available at http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publica-
tion.asp?publication id=380274&Language=E.
223. David McGowan, The Prospect of a North American Project: Couchiching Debates
"The Big Idea," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Vol. LVIII No. 3, Summer 2003, at 417.
224. Rethinking North American Integration Conference Report, Public Policy Forum,
Oct. 29-30, 2003, available at http://www.ppforum.com/ow/NAOutcomesfinal.
pdf.
225. Deborah Meyers, Does Smarter Lead to Safer: An Assessment of the Border Ac-
cords with Canada and Mexico, Migration Policy Institute, June 2003, available at
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however, that "it is important to remember that the war on terrorism
cannot be won through the immigration system, but must be fought
through increased information and intelligence capabilities. '226 Among
the policy recommendations made by Brigham Young Professor Earl T.
Fry was "some harmonization of security perimeter standards and immi-
gration and refugee policies. '227
THE HUFBAUER/SCHOTT THESIS
In January 2004, Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott published their pa-
per on deeper North American integration from an American perspective
as part of the CD Howe Border Papers. They note that "the political
imperative to work together has never been greater. But melding the
political, security and economic objectives of the three countries is now
more complex. '228 They also believe that NAFrA politics in the United
States are thus far more sensitive to Mexico than to Canada and that a
bilateral deal is less likely to garner the necessary support in Congress
than a trilateral deal.229
Hufbauer and Schott note:
the impetus in 2003 for further cooperation comes from the doctrine
of preemption. The NAFIFA partners must work more closely to-
gether now, so that-in case there are additional terrorist attacks
down the road-they will be less disposed to respond with knee-jerk
actions that disrupt goods and people moving across borders and
spawn enduring political acrimony. 230
They also accept that "the balance of postwar trade history still leans
heavily towards Dobson's thesis of a Big Idea as the way to get noticed in
Washington. "231
They admit that border security has certainly attracted the attention of
official Washington, but suggest that border security alone does not give
Canada added leverage to negotiate reforms in U.S. policies long resis-
tant to change:
Cooperation on security cuts both ways and the alternative for Ca-
nada to cooperating with the U.S. is less efficient and more intrusive
border restrictions by the United States. Still, the border-security
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/6-13-0%7E1.PDF (noting "while September
11 forced a reassessment of land borders and their vulnerability, it simultaneously
pointed to the security benefits of the US working ever more closely with its con-
tiguous neighbors").
226. Id. at 20.
227. Earl T. Fry, The Future of North American Economic Integration: National and
Sub-National Perspectives, available at hnp://www.ppforum.ca/gs/ProfEarlFry_
pres.pdf.
228. Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, Deeper North American Economic Integra-
tion: A US Perspective, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary No. 195, Jan. 2004, avail-
able at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer0104.pdf.
229. Id. at 5.
230. Id. at 6.
231. Id. at 7.
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issue establishes a higher priority for new negotiations on an agenda
of complementary economic and security concerns. In this regard,
Dobson's idea of a 'strategic bargain' makes sense, especially since
the two countries already have extensive economic integration in au-
tos, steel, and energy infrastructure.2 32
We believe that Ottawa, Washington and Mexico City can forge
common visa standards for most non-NAFTA visitors and immi-
grants. This goal is highly significant from a security standpoint. For
people arriving from outside the NAFTA region, the North Ameri-
can countries need a shared system for excluding non-NAFTA na-
tionals who pose a security threat....
Non-NAFTA visitors who threaten security can be better excluded
if a few principal measures are adopted. The NAFTA partners
should agree on visa-waiver country lists, length of stay, and watch
lists for potentially troublesome visitors. Officials in each country
should have electronic access to the immigration records of its part-
ners. These suggestions seem obvious. However, U.S. security agen-
cies, such as the FBI, CIA, Customs, and Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms (ATF), have yet to agree on a common watch list for poten-
tially troublesome visitors to the United States, so it will take politi-
cal energy to forge a common North American approach.
As well, NAFTA partners should create a special force to handle
all third-country immigration controls at the individual's first airport
of entry into NAFTA space. Common document and biometric
identification standards should be applied. Likewise, the partners
should create a more efficient system for handling legitimate trav-
elers among the three NAFTA countries. The Smart Border Accord
negotiated between Canada and the United States contains useful
elements: high-tech identity cards for permanent residents, using bio-
metric identifiers, and pre-clearance programs for frequent travelers
- known as INSPASS at airports and CANPASS, dedicated com-
muter lanes - at land borders. The same system should be extended
to cover visitors arriving from Mexico. 233
They also have suggestions with respect to handling the question of
illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States, a topic that is outside the
focus of this paper.
THE HUFBAUER/VEGA-CANOVAS COMMON FRONTIER
In 2002 Gary C. Hufbauer and Gustavo Vega-Canovas produced a
chapter on "Whither NAFTA: A Common Frontier?" for a book, The
Rebordering of North America? Integration and Exclusion in a New Se-
curity Context. Hufbauer and Vega proposed an agenda for action for the
three North American countries to avoid a worst-case scenario and fur-
ther the economic integration in North America.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 14.
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We have termed this agenda for action a Common Frontier. The
rationale for a Common Frontier is first to reduce the risk of security
threats, and second to channel new policy measures in a cooperative
direction if and when bad events occur. To have a chance of success,
this agenda would need to accommodate the political realities of
North America.234
Their agenda covered three topics: border management, defence alli-
ance, and immigration.
They noted that under a worst-case scenario, with new terrorist acts in
North America, it seems doubtful that the programs announced so far
will preclude the erection of formidable new security fences within North
America. Canada and Mexico should cooperate to achieve U.S. security
goals, and in return the United States should commit to maintain open
borders even in the aftermath of an attack. All three parties, meanwhile,
advance the agenda of economic integration. In their view, the Common
Frontier should be analogous to the 1980s concept of a European Eco-
nomic Space-designed to link the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFA).235
A Common Frontier project would have to be accompanied by a new
defence alliance among the three NAFTA partners. The alliance would
have two purposes. First, if North America is to have a Common Fron-
tier-implying relatively free internal movement of people, goods, and
capital, but a watchful eye on arrivals from abroad-the logical corollary
is strong defence for all modes of entry into the perimeter. Harmful in-
truders will otherwise enter at the weakest point. The second purpose is
to deal with threats arising within the Common Frontier-especially
threats that are organized or launched from the territory of one partner
into the territory of another. Hufbauer and Vegas-Canovas suggest sev-
eral ingredients for a North American Defence Alliance: (1) intelligence
sharing; (2) agreement on circumstances that justify electronic surveil-
lance of suspects within the Common Frontier; (3) defining the circum-
stances in which a NAFTA arrest warrant may be issued to detain a
suspect anywhere within the Common Frontier; (4) working closely and
even interchangeably with the NAFTA coast guard services to intercept
smugglers; and (5) new measures to speed the border crossing of business
travelers. 236
Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas admit that none of the measures they ad-
vocate would be easy. Indeed, most of the measures go beyond what the
European Union has achieved after nearly fifty years of economic
integration:
The measures we suggest may not even enter the realm of political
possibility unless one NAFTA partner is visibly attacked by forces
234. Gary C. Hufbauer & Gustavo Vega-Canovas, Whither NAFTA: A Common Fron-
tier?, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauerl202.pdf.
235. Id. at 8.
236. Id. at 13-14.
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that stage their operation in another NAFTA country. We contend,
however, that until elements of what we have coined a Common
Frontier are put in place, the risks of a worst-case scenario and the
reversal of North American integration will loom on the horizon.23 7
A threshold obstacle for our Common Frontier proposal is the ex-
tent of Canadian and Mexican support for preemptive strikes. Will
NAFTA partners prove to be steadfast military allies? [U.S.] leaders
will not ask Canada or Mexico to contribute special forces; but they
will expect intelligence tips, and they will react poorly to public criti-
cism from NAFTA leaders. The Common Frontier project, in other
words, will require robust support for the preemptive strike doctrine,
not just as an abstract proposition, but especially when mistakes are
made.2 38 ... In short, for the United States the overriding obstacle to
a Common Frontier project is the tentative and qualified cooperation
from Canada and Mexico.239
If that is the case, the chances for the Common Frontier project appear
minimal as neither the Canadian or Mexican governments has shown any
enthusiasm for the preemptive strike doctrine outside of a UN Security
Council mandate.
SIDNEY WEINTRAUB'S TAKE ON THE PERIMETER CONCEPT
In April 2003, Sidney Weintraub of the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies in Washington wrote:
the notion of perimeter screening to speed up the movement of
goods and residents of the two countries is logical on the surface, but
there are inherent problems that must be considered. Without any
border screening, the two countries would need identical immigra-
tion laws to permit the free movement of people from one country to
the other and a common tariff and other trade restrictions so that the
transshipment of goods from one country to the other would not
matter. These steps smack of sharing sovereignty rather than 'mu-
tual respect for sovereignty,' which is an essential element of the
CCCE proposal (see above and below).
Sharing sovereignty is not necessarily a bad idea, but is not what
the CCCE advocates. A common security perimeter for Canada and
the United States would omit Mexico, unless there was a common
North American perimeter-something that would multiply ancillary
complications many times over.240
Weintraub believes that having a common perimeter would be a much
bigger idea than a customs union because, in his judgment:
this would necessarily require both a common tariff and free move-
ment of people. A Canada-[U.S.] customs union would complicate
237. Id. at 20-21.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 23.
240. Sidney Weintraub, Strains in the Canada-US Relationship, ISSUES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, No. 40, Apr. 2003, Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, available at http://www.csis.org/simonchair/issues200304.pdf.
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North American unity under NAFTA because the U.S.-Mexican re-
lationship would continue to be one of free trade without a common
tariff. Mexico would be reluctant to enter into a North American
customs union because this would require terminating its free trade
agreement with the European Union.241
THE CCCE'S AGENDA FOR PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY,
JANUARY 2004
In January 2004, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives published
"A Canadian Agenda for Progress and Prosperity: Where Canada's Busi-
ness Leaders Stand," a forty page document which included a chapter on
"Striving for Advantage in North America. '242 The proposals follow
those enunciated in its January 2003 "North American Security and Pros-
perity Initiative" and are based on a trilateral rather than a bilateral ap-
proach. However, several of the key elements related to perimeter
security are conceived in a bilateral context:
i) our countries need to create a zone of cooperation encompassing
the continent rather than focusing security efforts on the line that
separates us. We must emphasize protection of the approaches to
North America while eliminating regulatory, procedural and infra-
structure barriers at our internal border; ii) we need to transform the
internal border into a shared checkpoint within the Canada-United
States economic space. The objective should be twofold: to shift the
burden of protecting our countries against global threats away from
the internal border to the approaches to North America; and to elim-
inate unnecessary regulatory, procedural and infrastructure barriers
at our internal border; iii) A shared system for commercial process-
ing, shared infrastructure, shared policing and even a voluntary
shared North American identification document all could help to
ease flows of people and goods across the border further without
threatening the security or sovereignty of either country; iv) building
on the more than forty-year record of cooperation through
NORAD, our countries should strive to create a North American
defence community of sovereign nations. The new partnership would
expand our commitment to include: a) defence of the continent's air-
space, including participation in a continental ballistic missile de-
fence system; b) shared protection of the maritime approaches to
North America; c) protection of critical infrastructure such as pipe-
lines, electronic networks, railways, bridges and transmission lines;
and d) cooperative reaction to natural and man-made disasters on
both sides of the border.243
241. Id. at 2. The author made the latter point to Weintraub and others at the NAFTA
at 10 Conference in Washington in December 2002.
242. A Canadian Agenda for Progress and Prosperity: Where Canada's Business Lead-
ers Stand, Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Jan. 2004, available at http://64.
26.159.96/en/about/A_CanadianAgenda forProgressandProsperity-April_
2004.pdf.
243. Id. at 28-29, 31-32.
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OPTIONS FOR NORTH AMERICAN PHYSICAL SECURITY
In the context of the considerations enumerated above, I would suggest
that there are at least eleven potential options for ensuring the security of
North America:
1. Maintain the status quo in defence/security/immigration/refugee
policies and in the level of cooperation, including the incremental-
ist approach built into the Smart Border plans;
2. Refuse to participate in BMD;
3. Participate in BMD with or without further cooperation with
NORTHCOM;
4. Significantly increase the Canadian defence budget;
5. Amend the administration of Canadian refugee and visitor visa
policies to reduce the security threat;
6. Agree on common policies for temporary visas and refugee/asylum
policies;
7. Formally develop the concentric ring approach to North American
security;
8. Adopt a Schengen type approach for free labour mobility within
North America and common entry procedures for non-North
Americans;
9. Support the American doctrine of unilateral pre-emption;
10. Adopt a perimeter approach for defence purposes only;
11. Adopt a perimeter approach for all kinds of threats;
12. Adopt a bilateral or trilateral approach.
The threat of a Fortress America mentality appears to have receded in
light of cooperation along the two U.S. land frontiers since 9/11. The
unknown is what would happen in the event of a second 9/11-type attack
on the United States, particularly if any of the terrorists gained access to
the United States through either Canada or Mexico. At a minimum,
there would be the type of short-term interruptions which characterized
the U.S. response to 9/11. A Fortress America mentality would rely on
existing borders as the best place to maintain controls. It could entail
increased delays to the flow of people and goods from north and south of
the United States, and thereby threaten the economic security of the two
largest trading partners of the United States and a lot of American invest-
ment in those countries.
A Fortress America is also very expensive and puts the emphasis of
control in the wrong area. Control should be at the perimeter points of
access to North America, which are not across the two land borders but
at airports and ports. The United States has recognized that it needs to
expand the perimeters of its security at least to the edges of North
America, and in many cases beyond. Passengers destined for the United
States and Canada from overseas countries-Europe, Asia, Latin
America, and elsewhere-go through pre-clearance checks before they
are allowed to get on the aircraft, which do more than verify their eligibil-
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ity to enter the United States and/or Canada. Canada and the United
States are cooperating in this effort in various European airports and
elsewhere. Container traffic is being pre-cleared in ports outside North
America.
Perimeter concepts for North America are not new and are best exem-
plified in the long standing Canada/United States defence partnership.
Similar activities were happening in the civilian side prior to 9/11 and
have since become codified in the Smart Border Declaration and Action
Plan. While some Americans may see the northern border as posing as
much of a threat as the southern border, many see differences between
the two.
Various ideas have been put forward for concentric circles of perimeter
security, and some of these are incorporated into the Smart Border plans.
The concept of a security perimeter could be limited strictly to a military/
defence one in the face of traditional threats. But the new threats to
North American security do not come from state actors but non-state
actors. The most appropriate means of defence against these threats lies
outside the traditional military pattern and involves intelligence sharing,
police cooperation, tighter administration of refugee/asylum policies, and
visitor visas. Here again, the past experiences of Canada and the United
Sates and Mexico and the United States are widely divergent. For Ca-
nada, defence cooperation with the United States has a long and on-going
history. For Mexico, it might/would be a new and very controversial
matter.
Canada and the United States are countries of immigration with
processes in place to deal with the security threats posed by new immi-
grants, those claiming refugee or asylum status, and short term visitors or
students. Some of the deficiencies in the existing systems in both coun-
tries have been identified. It is clear that both governments are working
on them, in both cases, perhaps not as intensely as the other would wish,
but progress is being made and a level of confidence established that has
seen Canadian citizens exempted from the entry-exit provisions of post-9/
11 U.S. law. Whether this is sustainable will depend on the continuing
levels of cooperation. The focus on this issue by the new Martin govern-
ment gives rise to some optimism in this respect.
A security perimeter around Canada and the United States exists for
air and space (detection) purposes. The introduction of a U.S. BMD sys-
tem at the end of 2004 will provide a perimeter for Canada and the
United States and cities in northern Mexico, whether or not Canada and/
or Mexico chose to participate. My bet is that, given the very changed
geopolitical situation, Canada will become associated with BMD. But
this system will not provide any defence against nuclear attacks on North
America except from ballistic missiles. To the extent that there is a threat
of nuclear attack from terrorist groups, which would not use missiles to
deliver their weapons, this makes heightened cooperation on intelligence,
immigration and policing operations all the more important.
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There are major elements of increased cooperation between security
and police services built into the two Smart Border accords. Some of the
agreed elements between Canada and the United States, like the safe
third country agreement, have yet to be implemented, but the general
level of confidence appears to be such that exemptions from what were to
be universal policies have been obtained for Canadians in most instances
and for some Mexicans.
The Martin government has committed itself to improved cooperation
with the United States to improve the security of North America (in a
bilateral sense), and reforms to the administration of the refugee policy
and the IRB. It has opened the door to possible participation of some
sort in BMD and an amendment to the NORAD agreement. It has also
made noises about increasing the defence budget. Whether the amount
will be enough to impress the United States is an open question. The
attempt to craft a national security strategy based on the U.S. concept of
Homeland Security is another indication that the changes are more than
cosmetic. These developments appear to rule out the status quo-type op-
tion and suggest that Canada and the United States are already moving
towards increasing cooperation over several areas which will have the ef-
fect of strengthening the security perimeter of northern North America.
Many Canadians and a lot of Americans may want to pay lip service to
the concept of trilateralism in North America, but do not want the many
practical problems that this presents to impede progress on a bilateral
level.
Proposals for increased labour mobility within North America are hos-
tage to the new security climate. The CUSFTA and NAFTA introduced
TN visas for certain categories of skilled professionals, with major differ-
ences in application between those issued by the United States for Mexi-
cans and for Canadians.24 4 Full scale labour mobility between Mexico
and the United States is seen as a major threat to the United States and
an economic drag. Whether it might be possible to envisage a widening
of the categories for NAFTA, TN visas is another matter. In any event,
full labour mobility inside the European Union did not come until after it
had gone from customs union, to common market and economic union.
That would appear to be a pre-cursor to any Schengen type of agreement
which governs admission from outside the borders of the EU and effec-
tively abolished controls on the internal borders. Proposals to abolish all
controls on the Canada-U.S. or Mexico-U.S. borders would run into
strong opposition on both sides of the two borders for reasons mentioned
in this paper.
The Dymond/Hart concept that Canada shares a perimeter with the
United States, defined by geography, economics, shared values, and com-
244. Until September 30, 2003, there was a yearly ceiling of 5,500 TNs visas for Mexi-
cans and no ceiling for Canadians. The ceiling on Mexican TN visas no longer
exists. Mexicans have to apply for their TN visas at U.S. Consulates in Mexico.
Canadians apply for their TN visas at the port of entry into the United States.
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mon challenges, is persuasive in many respects. Since 9/11 many aspects
of that perimeter have been tightened up as the Smart Border plans are
put into operation. Many observers believe the perimeter concept is be-
ing applied, perhaps incrementally, but nonetheless applied. There still
remains much to do by all three countries before any true perimeter can
be established outside the area of defence.
OPTIONS FOR A NORTH AMERICAN PERIMETER FOR
PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC SECURITY
1. Maintain the status quo as provided in NAFTA.
2. Negotiate a common external tariff to eliminate rules of origin.
3. Negotiate a full customs union with a common trade policy.
4. Negotiate elements of a customs union and a common market
(Dobson).
5. Negotiate a common market with full mobility of labour.
6. Negotiate a new agreement designed to deal with deeper integration
with the necessary institutional backdrop to support them
(Dymond-Hart/CCEO/Dobson/Gotlieb, etc.).
The issue of whether the perimeter should be for both physical and
economic security resonates most among Canadians and Mexicans who
are much more dependent on continued access to the U.S. market than
the United States is to their markets. The collective wisdom of many is
that there is no appetite in any of the capitals for the type of agreement
which would bring physical and economic security together. That may
well be the case, but in 1983-84, the prospects for a bilateral free trade
agreement between Canada and the United States did not loom large on
anyone's radar screen, and within eighteen months of the election of the
Mulroney government, negotiations had started. The issue then for
Canadians was the threat of increased U.S. protectionism and how best to
secure access to the U.S. market.
Economic integration has been happening faster than most predicted.
Those sectors of the economy, which are more highly integrated, have
seen a marked decline in the number of cases of countervail and anti-
dumping actions by the United States.245 The continuing uncertainties of
the border, even with free trade, have implications for investment deci-
sions, where Canada appears to be losing out to the United States in the
amount of non North American FDI.246 The October 2003 "NAFTA @
10" report by DFAIT said that, "the susceptibility of Canada-U.S. trade
245. See Patrick Macrory, Dispute Resolution in the NAFTA: A Surprising Record of
Success, C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 168, Sept. 2002, available at http://www.
cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary-168.pdf.
246. Rapport Sur Les Enjeux de Politiques, Investment Partnerships Canada, Mar. 2003,
at 4 (showing that Canada's share of FDI from outside North America has
dropped from approximately 10% in 1988 to 6% in 2000, and that there has been a
corresponding increase in the U.S. share of such FDI from outside North America,
which has gone from 88% to 92% in the same period.
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to increased security and delays at the border is one of the most challeng-
ing aspects to Canadian trade policy over the medium term. '247 The
same report also suggests that "the greatest impact of increased border
frictions may not be on trade, but on foreign direct investment (FDI)."
While the proponents of the "big idea" or "strategic bargain" suggested
linking American concerns, with security and Canadian and Mexican con-
cerns with economic security, the reality is that Canadians should be just
as concerned about physical security as their American counterparts. Ca-
nada needs to move on the security front to protect itself as well as to
provide increased assurances to the United States that terrorists will not
use Canada as a drop-off point from which to attack the United States.
That appears to be the way in which the new Martin government is
proceeding.
There has been no clear indication from the United States government
as to how a proposal from Canada would be viewed. Canada should not
expect any such indication from the U.S. side until the Canadian side has
determined what it wants. There is no agreement in Canada on how to
deal with the realities of increasing integration, and there was a clear de-
cision by the Chr6tien government to avoid serious debate on the matter.
The Martin government will not want to unveil its thoughts in this respect
until after a federal election, and probably not until after the U.S. presi-
dential election this fall. Some people, including myself, believe that this
built-in delay is a propitious time for the Martin government to establish
a new Royal Commission on Canada's economic prospects in an increas-
ingly integrated North America. Creating such a commission before a
Canadian general election with an eighteen-month time frame to report
back would start the ball rolling in terms of identifying Canadian objec-
tives, or some real options.
What this means is that the physical security and economic security
agendas will not be linked (many agree they shouldn't be) because there
is a greater need to proceed on the former than the later. So the poten-
tial trade-off of a strategic bargain does not appear possible at the present
time and it may not ever be. But that doesn't obviate the necessity from
looking at both aspects of security and honing in on what is necessary for
Canada's interests and for those of Mexico. Canada cannot afford to be
seen as delaying implementation of changes to policy or the administra-
tion of policy that will increase physical security because of the potential
that movement in that area might mean movement by the United States
in terms of our economic security' It also means that proposals for an
economic perimeter will have to be developed on their own merits, of
which there are many.
The Mexico issue is complex, sensitive, and likely to complicate mat-
ters, because Mexico's relationship with the United States is much more
complex than Canada's already complex relationship. Furthermore,
247. NAFTA @ 10: A Preliminary Report, DFAIT Oct. 2003, at 4, available at http://
www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eet/research/nafta/nafta-en.asp.
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Mexico's vast network of bilateral free trade agreements could be an im-
pediment to moving to a North American customs union and/or common
market. It has to be in Canada's and the United States' interest that
Mexico make the transition from developing country to a developed
country. Part of the history of the European Union has been to include
economically under developed countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece
in the union for political purposes (to anchor them in democracy--a goal
which appears to have succeeded). Even those like the Canadian Council
of Chief Executives, who call for a trilateral approach, envision a very
bilateral approach to many of the physical and economic security
problems identified in this paper. Many observers have suggested that
the European example of "two speeds" might be appropriate for North
America. Start off with a Canada-U.S. relationship, and at a later date
move to include Mexico when it is ready. Mexico should be excluded
from any talks about designing any new architecture; we should not be-
come hostage to Mexico, notwithstanding the views of Hufbauer and
Schott that Mexico has to be included in any deal for it to fly in Congress.
CONCLUSION
The either/or construct of "Fortress America or Fortress North
America" is not reflective of the reality that is happening in North
America. We already have a variety of perimeters around Canada and
the United States, and the countries are strengthening these perimeters
by correcting many of their existing weaknesses. A Canada-U.S. border
that can have fifteen "Smart Border" points and 4,000 miles of the forest
primeval cannot be the perimeter on which the United States bases its
homeland security. Canada has agreed to be part of various American
perimeters to meet previous threats to its security. Neither country can
individually address all of the threats posed by terrorists to the North
American continent. Heightened security for North American can only
come with increased cooperation between the three countries concerned,
even if the levels of cooperation are at different levels. This does not
imply a harmonization of immigration or refugee policies or a loss of sov-
ereignty. Rather, it implies using Canadian sovereignty wisely to counter
the new threats that can exploit weakness in a system designed prior to 9/
11. NORAD has not threatened Canadian sovereignty over the past
forty-six years, and it has enhanced our security. The cooperation re-
quired to meet the new threat goes far beyond military cooperation and
extends to enhanced cooperation and information sharing in the intelli-
gence, police, and immigration areas.
Attempts to link physical and economic security in North America,
while conceptually sound, are out of sync with both the requirements and
the political realities on both sides of the two borders with the United
States. Canadians and their government need to act on physical security
issues now, in their own interests. They also need to tackle the issue of
what is required by governments in the face of deepening economic inte-
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gration to best protect Canada's interests. A new arrangement for eco-
nomic security with the United States is required. It needs to be as
comprehensive as possible and it needs to be ambitious and of sufficient
weight to catch attention in Washington. It will probably involve the cre-
ation of a strengthened economic perimeter around Canada and the
United States, going beyond free trade to a common external tariff, and
the creation of new joint institutions. I do not think this can be done on a
trilateral basis at this time, but the possibility of Mexico participating at a
later time should not be excluded.
